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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to provide classroom teachers a more unified theory of 
cognition. The current cognitive theories of information processing, schema theory, and 
constructivism exhibit limitations and a lack of cohesion that make their implications for 
teachers unclear. This paper will be presented in five sections. 1) The first describes 
problems with current cognitive theories and the need for a unified theory of cognition 2) 
The second provides a review of the literature of current cognitive theories. 3) The third 
section consists of research in the history of cognitive theory both in philosophy and 
psychology. 4) The fourth describes how a fresh look at the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant can provide a more unified cognitive theory to educational psychology. 5) Finally, 
the paper offers specific implications for instruction under these headings: 
1. Teachers should describe the concept to be taught as a rule. 
2. Teachers should introduce the concept rule by experience or by example. 
3. Teachers should use the concept rule as a framework for effective questioning. 
4. Teachers should describe the rule with abstract language only after students have 
understood the rule. 
VI 
Chapter 1: Identification of the Problem 
Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to provide classroom teachers a unified theory of cognition. 
The current cognitive theories of information processing, schema theory and 
constructivism have provided insights that have greatly improved classroom practice. 
However, when considered independently and as a whole, they exhibit limitations, which 
make their application in classrooms difficult. Viewed independently, each theory suffers 
from vagueness and an inability to describe common phenomena. When considered as a 
whole, their relationship is unclear and at times contradictory. Specifically, information 
processing provides a general understanding of cognitive architecture while schema 
theory and constructivism provide a general understanding of cognitive processes, but 
classroom teachers still need a theory that can unify understanding of architecture and 
processes, of structure and function. This paper will propose such a unified theory. 
This paper will be presented in five chapters. The first describes the limitations of 
current cognitive theories and the need for a unified theory of cognition. The second 
provides a review of the literature of current cognitive theories. The third chapter consists 
of research in the history of cognitive theory both in philosophy and psychology. The 
fourth describes how a fresh look at the philosophy of Immanuel Kant can provide a 
more unified cognitive theory. The final chapter offers specific implications for 
instruction under these headings: 
• Teachers should describe the concept to be taught as a rule. 
• Teachers should introduce the concept rule by experience or by example. 
• Teachers should use the concept rule as a framework for effective questioning. 
• Teachers should describe the rule with abstract language only after students have 
understood the rule. 
The limitations of information processing theory 
• How does background knowledge affect information processing? 
Kelly & Lindsay (1996) emphasize the unconscious influence of background 
knowledge: 
Past experiences can have pervasive effects on an individual's current behavior 
without that individual necessarily having a conscious recollection of those 
experiences. Perception, problem solving, thinking, and judgment can all be 
altered by the effects of specific past experiences in the absence of conscious 
remembering. (p. 31) 
However, classic information processing, with its one-way flow of information from 
sensory memory to working memory to long-term memory, cannot explain how 
background knowledge affects perception and reasoning. For example, information 
processing cannot explain why an expert physician might perceive an abnormality in an 
x-ray that a novice might not perceive. Beers (1987) refers to the work of Shaw & 
Bransford (1977) when stating, "the machine metaphor responsible for the information 
processing approach typically glosses over questions concerning the nature and origin of 
the information process, how information is selected and how its value is determined" (p. 
374). Furthermore, information processing, in its classic structure, suggests a "rigid 
architecture of the mind" (Mayer 1996, p. 157), which is not able to explain the role of 
beliefs and expectations in learning (Mayer, 1996). For example, information processing 
cannot explain why a learner with a high self-concept of mathematical ability might work 
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longer and harder on a difficult math problem than a student with a correspondingly low 
self-concept. 
• How do errors or differences in information processing occur? 
Suppose two students are briefly shown the sentence, "The cowboy rode tall tall 
in the saddle." One student might recall it exactly as written, while another student might 
recall it as, "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle." Information processing cannot explain 
how the second student's expectations affected his perception of the stimulus. 
• How does information enter long-term memory (L TM) without ever being in 
working memory (WM)? 
Classic information processing suggests all information passes through WM before 
being encoded in L TM. However, there is evidence that information may go directly to 
L TM (Anderson, 2000; Pashler & Carrier, 1996). Pashler and Carrier (1996) suggest 
information typically follows the path from WM into L TM through voluntary 
elaboration, but they also state, "being in STM [short-term or working memory] may be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for copying into L TM" (p. 18). They cite as evidence the 
work of Shall ice and Washington (1970) who found that patients with grossly defective 
verbal STM could perform normally in delayed recall of word lists. This illustrates how 
information can directly enter L TM. 
Not only can information be passively recorded directly into LTM, there is also 
evidence that learners actively develop understanding in the unconscious L TM. Consider 
the language acquisition device, suggested by Noam Chomsky (1972, 1976), by which 
children form and follow syntactical rules (so that a child might say, "I goed [sic] to the 
store" or, "This one is gooder [sic]"). Children use these words without having actually 
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heard them or consciously forming the rules to create them. This is evidence that the 
L TM is not simply a repository at the end of the information processing line, but L TM 
can actively construct understanding directly from experience. 
• How are memories unconsciously elaborated in L TM? 
The passive L TM of information processing could perhaps explain changes in 
knowledge due to forgetting, if forgetting occurs by decay or interference. Memories 
could be passively reduced by decay, or memories could passively interfere with 
conscious access of other memories. However information processing cannot explain 
additive or creative elaborations of memories. Consider an experiment conducted by 
Conway and Ross (1984) in which a group of students were asked to rate their study 
skills and then were assigned to a study skill instruction group (experimental group) and a 
waiting list group (control group). After the program, students in the experimental group 
exaggerated the weakness of their initial study skills as well as the improvement in their 
grades due to the program (there was no real change). The experimental group had an 
expectation of change that caused them to unconsciously reconstruct the past to fit the 
expectation. This cannot be explained by passive interference or decay, but only by 
unconscious elaboration. Loftus (1993) describes the creation of false memories: 
Numerous studies have shown that people misremember that they voted in a 
particular election when they actually had not (Abelson, Loftus, & Greenwald, 
1992). One interpretation of these findings is that people fill in gaps in their 
memory with socially desirable constructions, thus creating for themselves a false 
memory of voting. (p. 532) 
Loftus and Loftus (1980) conclude, "It may not be possible, in some circumstances, to 
ever discover from interviewing someone what happened in that person's past. Not only 
might the original acquired memory have departed from reality in some systematic way, 
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but the memory may have been continually subject to change after it was initially stored" 
(p. 419). We are "revisionist historians" (Johnson & Sherman, 1990, p. 497). Information 
processing cannot explain the unconscious elaboration of memories. 
• How does information "pop" into one's consciousness? 
Information processing suggests that WM consciously retrieves information from 
L TM. Hearing the question, "What is the fourth planet from the sun?" a person will 
consciously retrieve a list of planets and count through the list and answer, "Mars." It is 
as if the conscious and active hand ofWM is accessing the volumes of knowledge on the 
unconscious passive bookshelf of L TM. While this may be an accurate view of some 
cognitive processes, it is obviously an oversimplification. The analogy breaks down when 
we realize how frequently information enters consciousness without conscious effort. It is 
as if the bookshelf is continuously and actively thrusting books into the hand, which is 
busier putting books back on the shelf than it is pulling them off. Information processing 
cannot explain this common phenomenon. 
The unconscious consists, at least in part, of past experiences and expectations for 
the future. Neither the experiences nor the expectations are passive and fixed; both are 
active and fluid. Our present consciousness is continually affected by our experiences and 
expectations. Yet the relationship goes the other way as well; the present continually 
affects the construction and reconstruction of experience and expectations. Johnson and 
Sherman (1990) give us an interesting metaphor to describe how past experiences and 
expectations of the future are related to present cognition: 
Past, present and future are not discrete divisions among an orderly succession of 
life's events. Rather, past, present and future fold backward and forward like 
Japanese origami. They collapse onto each other, emerge from each other, and 
constantly determine each other, as we construct and reconstruct both [sic] past, 
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present and future in the present, and the past and future construct the present. (p. 
482) 
There is a constant and fluid movement of information among our senses, our 
conscious present, and our unconscious experiences and expectations. Therefore, any 
theory that describes a one-way flow of information from sensory memory to conscious 
working memory to unconscious long-term memory and that describes long-term 
memory as passive, is inadequate. 
The limitations of schema theory 
• What exactly is a schema? 
Critics of schema theory (Sadoski, Pavio, & Goetz, 1991) charge, "schema theory is 
encumbered by a lack of consistent definition" (p. 463) being "variously defined by 
comparison to stereotypes, prototypes, templates, scripts, plans, and grammars" (p. 466). 
Prominent developers of schema theory give us little hope of clarity stating, "schemata 
are not linguistic entities but abstract symbolic representations of knowledge which we 
express and describe in language" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 111). These same 
authors give us four essential features of "schemata- the generic concept of memory ... a) 
they have the variables b) they embed one within another c) they represent generic 
concepts which vary in their level of abstraction d) they represent knowledge rather than 
simple definitions" (p. 101). To describe schemata as varied, generic, and 
indistinguishable does little to pinpoint meaning. Brown (1979) makes the point with a 
touch of humor: 
One of my favorite games is to remove the word schema from a paper written in 
schematese and look for changes in meaning. Take, for example, the sentence 
'preexisting knowledge schemata function to orient people in a certain way.' 
Where is the loss of clarity in removing the word schemata? It is somewhat 
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surprising to find there is rarely a loss of meaning following such ablation tactics. 
(p.231) 
It is ironic that teachers are told that the more new knowledge is incorporated into 
pre-existing schemata the more meaningful it should be, yet the very term "schemata" is 
not as meaningful as it should be. If teachers are expected to help students create 
schemata, then teachers should have a clear idea of what they are. Currently schema 
theory is not providing this much needed clarity. 
• How do schemata relate to our cognitive architecture? 
In relation to long-term memory (L TM), working memory (WM), and meta-
cognitive processes, where are schemata formed? Where are they stored? Where do they 
operate? If "schemata are defined as 'frameworks' with 'slots' to be filled, or 'packets' of 
knowledge contained within larger 'packets' of knowledge" (Sadoski et aI., 1991, p. 
466), then schemata could be formed and stored in the passive L TM of information 
processing theory. However, schema theory stresses the active role of schemata. Beers 
(1987) describes active schemata: "The features of text to which readers attend depend 
upon the schemata guiding the attention of readers" (p. 373). 
Information processing in its rigid sense suggests that processing is a "bottom-up" 
process, an inductive process in which raw data enters through the senses and is 
abstracted into generalizations. However, schema theory gives an avenue to explain "top-
down" processing, a deductive process in which our pre-existing generalizations guide 
attention, perception and even reasoning. In discussing the schema-theoretic viewpoint of 
reading comprehension, Andre (1987) maintains, "Processing is both bottom-up and top-
down" (p. 270). This view of the active top-down influence of schemata does not mesh 
with the purely bottom-up processes of classic information processing. For all the 
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valuable emphasis it places on the role of background knowledge in learning, schema 
theory has not successfully defined itself independently or in relation to information 
processing. 
For its part, information processing theory is reaching toward a more integrative 
bottom-up and top-down approach as evidenced by Koenke's (1984) identification of 
three models of information processing theory: bottom-up, top-down, and interactional 
models - wherein "comprehension is an interaction between the processing of the text 
and the use of the reader's experiences and expectancies" (p. 116). While there is a need 
and desire to relate schema theory and information processing, such a unified theory has 
not yet been developed and widely accepted. 
The limitations of constructivism 
• What exactly is constructivism? 
Mayer (1996) describes constructivism as educational psychology's third metaphor 
(following behaviorism and information processing). Mayer offers, "the central tenet of 
constructivism is that humans are knowledge constructors" (p. 151) as opposed to the 
mere knowledge recorders of behaviorism or the knowledge processors of information 
processing. Mayer believes that the continuing search to define this metaphor is a "hot 
topic" (p. 151) that will ultimately lead educational psychology down one of two paths: 
the scientific path based on empirical quantitative and qualitative research, or the critical 
path based on "philosophical, political, and humanistic sources" (p. 160). 
Derry (1992) agrees that constructivism is a divided perspective, being separated into 
3 schools, cognitive constructivism, cognitive symbolic processing, and radical 
constructivism. She dismisses radical constructivism as "largely a philosophical 
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movement" (p. 415) while she describes cognitive constructivism as primarily concerned 
with the use of schemata in reading, while cognitive symbolic processing has pursued the 
subject matter psychologies in the information processing framework. 
Both Mayer's and Derry's remarks lead one to conclude that constructivism is not 
really a cognitive theory per se, but a unique and important perspective to analyze 
existing theories. The constructivist perspective is a collection of important principles: 
1) knowledge is constructed, not merely recorded or processed, by individuals, 
(Phillips, 2000); 
2) knowledge construction is affected by the experiences and development of the 
learner (Piaget,1952, 1959, 1970); 
3) knowledge construction occurs in a social context (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). 
These principles in themselves do not establish a cognitive theory, but they are 
important founding principles of cognitive theory. A theory that unified schema theory 
with information processing theory must also use as its foundation these principles of 
constructivism. Therefore, a theory that explicitly related schema theory and information 
processing theory, incorporating the principles of constructivism, would help clarify and 
unify constructivism as well. 
• How does knowledge construction relate to our cognitive architecture? 
Constructivism can answer some questions that information processing alone 
cannot. As discussed above, information processing cannot explain how errors or 
differences in learning occur. However, the constructivist principle that knowledge is 
constructed, not merely processed, can explain how two learners, exposed to the same 
perceptual stimulus, can construct unique knowledge. However, like schema theory, 
9 
constructivism does not describe exactly how or where knowledge is constructed or 
stored in relation to our cognitive architecture as described by information processing. 
Also, like schema theory, this limitation is not merely descriptive but prescriptive. 
If teachers do not know exactly how knowledge is constructed, they will not know 
exactly how to help students construct knowledge. If as Mayer (1996) states, 
constructivism "was not developed solely in laboratories and passed on to educators but 
was rather the result of the need to explain what happens in real educational settings" 
(p.1S1), then constructivism must pursue this need through reconciliation with 
information processing and schema theory. 
The Need and Possibility of a Unified Theory of Cognition 
Evidence indicates that teachers in K -12 classrooms "do not routinely locate and 
translate research-based knowledge to inform their efforts" (Hiebert, Gallimore, & 
Stigler, 2002, p. 3). The understanding required to interpret the information in a range of 
theories often overwhelms teachers and detracts from their abilities to use these theories 
to inform their practice. After a thorough study of information processing, constructivism 
and schema theory, a classroom teacher would still be left with these important and 
unanswered questions: 
• If students construct their own understanding, what is my role? 
• How can I help students adapt to the limitations of working memory? 
• How do I capitalize on learners' beliefs and motivations to increase learning? 
• How do I accommodate learner background differences and the influences these 
differences have on the processes involved in knowledge construction? 
• How can I help students construct schemas if I am not sure what they are? 
10 
This problem of relating theory to practice is becoming increasingly significant in the 
wake of criticisms directed at the AERA and the increasing number of teachers who 
participate in AERA conferences. "Critics have accused the Washington-based group of 
doing too little to bridge the gap between research and classroom practice" (Viadero, 
2000, p. 6). A theory that helps to clarify and relate information processing, 
constructivism and schema theory would help classroom teachers be more effective. 
Educational psychology is not currently providing schools such a unified theory 
of cognition. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher on whose ideas much of this paper 
is based believed, "the greatest and most difficult problem to which man can devote 
himself is the problem of education" (Kant, 1804/1966, p. 11), and "the prospect of a 
theory of education is a glorious ideal" (p. 8). However, current thought seems to view 
this ideal, not only as glorious, but unattainable. 
In honor of the American Psychological Association's centennial in 1992, the 
Journal of Educational Psychology published two articles from respected authors Richard 
Mayer and Sharon Derry that peered into the future of educational psychology. Neither 
author described educational psychology as close or even moving toward a truly unified 
approach. Mayer believes that unifying our current understanding of cognition would be 
too broad an approach, excluding important distinctions in the "psychologies of subject 
matter" (Mayer, 1992). In contrast, Derry believes that unifying our current 
understanding of cognition would be too narrow an approach, being only concerned with 
mere symbolic processing and not encompassing the social nature of learning beyond the 
classroom. Must we choose between Mayer's tight focus on psychologies of subject 
matter or Derry's expanding focus beyond the classroom? 
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Mayer (1992) contends that in educational psychology "fractionation is giving 
way to a unified cognitive approach" (p. 406). However, what he calls the "unified 
cognitive approach" is not a single theory of cognition but separate and distinct 
"psychologies of subject matter" (p. 409). He sees educational psychology with its 
psychologies of subject matter as the "meeting ground for cognition and instruction" (p. 
411). Educational psychologists equipped with psychologies of subject matter can 
function as mediators between classic experimental psychologists who have failed to find 
general laws of learning and classroom teachers who struggle to implement research-
based practices. He proposes, "whereas a focus on general psychology failed to produce 
general laws of learning and cognition, domain-based research offers a potentially 
productive attempt to understand human learning within specific subject matter domains" 
(p. 409). Is it true that the cognitive approach that has unified us also prevents us from 
being unified? To some the paradoxical answer is, "Yes." According to Di Vesta (1987), 
"Underlying the assumptions of the learner as an active processor is another assumption 
that there is no one set of generalized learning laws with each law applying to all 
domains" (p. 208-209). 
Certainly people who argue against a unified theory along these lines are using 
too strict a measure. Even the natural sciences do not boast "laws" in the sense that 
Mayer suggests educational psychology has "failed to find" or that DiVesta (1987) 
doubts even exist. Kitcher (1990) points out, "individual psychology is a historical 
science," and that, "cognitive science as applied to individuals is in the same position as a 
geology or evolutionary biology. Again, however, none of this speaks against the 
possibility of a bona fide scientific theory of the processes involved in this phase of 
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reasoning" (p. 204). For example, Newton's "laws" of motion provided a functional 
framework for physics and engineering for decades until Einstein proved them 
inadequate. 
Educational psychology has progressed through the "laws" of structuralism, 
functionalism, behaviorism, as each school of thought has proved the previous ones 
inadequate. Even if we are unable to find unalterable unified laws of learning, there is 
much to be gained from seeking a unified theory. To further illustrate the point, consider 
how geology cannot explain the formation of one individual rock, yet it can explain the 
formation ofrocks in general (Kitcher, 1990). Similarly, educational psychology may not 
be able to describe the formation of one individual thought, but it can explain the 
formation of thoughts in general. The fact that any belief, expectation or situation can 
affect our cognitive processes does not negate the possibility of a limited, but unified, 
cognitive theory. 
While Mayer sees unification of current cognitive theory as too broad of a goal, 
Derry (1992) objects that it is too narrow. Commenting on the possibility of a more 
unified cognitive approach, she questions the "potential for further progress, given the 
constraints imposed by current use of subject matter boundaries, combined with present 
theoretical orientations" (p. 414). In response to Mayer's optimism regarding 
psychologies of subject matter, Derry contends, "cognitive psychology is currently 
especially deficient in its capacity to guide the search for the true nature of complex 
problem solving as it is manifested in the world of work and every activity that occurs 
outside classrooms" (p. 414). She refers to Greeno (l989a, 1989b) when she laments, 
"current theoretical framing assumptions ... have not propelled researchers forward in 
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their search to understand productive and critical thinking, motivation and creativity" (p. 
414). To take educational psychology "beyond symbolic processing" Derry puts forward 
the idea of situated cognition, a viewpoint in which "cognition must be viewed as an 
integral part of the physical, social and cultural context to which it belongs" (p. 416). 
Situated cognition stresses the role of apprenticeships in communities of practice, the 
negotiation of knowledge within a community, and sees motivation and self-concept as 
social phenomenon. She believes situated cognition "suggests an incredibly rich new set 
of metaphors that offer educational researchers and theoreticians a great deal" (p. 417). 
Derry's call for educational psychology to focus on the social nature oflearning 
as it actually occurs in the world is not an extreme position. Certainly constructivists like 
Vygotsky (1978, 1986) have brought much needed attention to the social aspects of 
learning. Certainly Mayer (1992), who shuns educational psychology's identification 
with "classical experimental psychology" (p. 411), would resonate with Derry's (1992) 
call for educational psychology to be relevant in "the world of work and every activity 
that occurs outside classrooms" (p. 414). Is it Derry's contention that theories of 
symbolic processing are relevant to the irrelevant process of schooling? No, she wants to 
focus attention on communities of practice, which "include the social, working, school, 
and family communities with which learners identify" (p. 416). Is her contention that if 
cognition is more than mere symbolic processing, then we should ignore symbolic 
processing? No, Derry shows herself as a proponent of balance rather than extremes 
when she concludes, "any theory of learning or instruction that focuses exclusively 
(emphasis mine) on the construction of symbolic knowledge by individuals is regarded as 
inadequate" (p. 416). Derry's challenge to educational theory is to place the learner's 
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symbolic processing in the proper social context to truly account for participation, 
enculturation, apprenticeship and motivation. 
Both Mayer's and Derry's views of educational psychology's future may not be 
as irreconcilable as they at first seem. It is true that Mayer focuses on an individual's 
cognitive processes while Derry is more concerned with social processes. However a 
theory that attempted to unify our understanding of cognitive architecture as described by 
information processing and cognitive processes as described by constructivism and 
schema theory, would allow educational psychology to develop in individual and social 
contexts. A general or unified theory of learning would allow educational psychology to 
study various psychologies of subject matter as well as to study learning as a socially 
situated activity. Having seen the inadequacies of current cognitive theories and having 
received guidance on the future of cognitive theory, we are now ready to move toward 
what Kant called the "glorious ideal" of a unified theory of education. 
How to Move Toward a Unified Theory of Cognition 
This paper will take three broad steps to move towards a unified theory of 
cognition: 1) review the current literature of cognition 2) research the history of cognition 
in philosophy and psychology 3) apply key ideas from the history of cognition to clarify 
and unify current views of cognition. 
The review of literature will briefly summarize current views of cognition. Topics 
reviewed will include information processing theory, constructivism, schema theory, 
procedural and declarative knowledge, and concept learning theory. This review of 
literature will help give an overview of these perspectives and set the boundaries for the 
research that follows. 
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The next step will be to research the history of cognition in philosophy and 
psychology. It will search for the historical answer to the question, "How do we learn?" 
The research will show that there are two extreme and competing schools of thought that 
have developed around this question. These schools are known in philosophy as 
empiricism and rationalism. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant will be presented as a 
balanced synthesis of these two views. These two philosophical schools of thought 
continued to influence the history of psychology, in which they have been labeled as 
experience centered and mind centered approaches (Reynolds, Sinatra & Jetton, 1996). 
Kant's thought will be shown to balance these psychological approaches just as it 
balanced philosophical approaches. 
The third step will be to apply Kant's thought directly to the limitations of current 
cognitive theory as already described. Many of the vague and contradictory aspects of 
current cognitive theories will be clarified and unified by this Kantian analysis. Also, 
included in this chapter is a critique of Dual Coding Theory (DCT), as DCT presents 
itself as a challenge to Kantian schematism. Finally and importantly, the paper will 
explicitly describe the implications of this unified theory in K -12 classrooms. 
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Chapter II: Review of Literature 
The review of literature will briefly summarize our current views of cognition. 
Topics reviewed will include information processing theory, constructivism, schema 
theory, procedural and declarative knowledge, and concept learning theory. This review 
of literature will help give an overview of the history and development of these 
perspectives. These perspectives form the theoretical foundations and set the boundaries 
for the research that follows. Occasionally some findings of the research may be 
mentioned in the course of this review to focus the reader's attention on the most salient 
aspects of the perspectives. 
Information Processing Theory 
Information processing achieved its status as educational psychology's "second 
metaphor" in reaction to the shortcomings of its first metaphor, behaviorism (Mayer, 
1996). Influential psychologist E.L. Thorndike's (191111965) "law of effect" and "law of 
exercise" characterize the behaviorist view. The "law of effect" is that any behavioral 
response that brings pleasure will be repeated while a response that brings discomfort 
will not. The "law of exercise" is that the repetition of a response will lead to its further 
repetition. Thus the behaviorist view is that all learning is of one type, the passive 
association of stimulus and response. 
The view that there is essentially one type of learning, learning by association, 
began to ring hollow with psychologists in the 1940' s. Gagne et al. (1993) suggest that 
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the desire to understand more complex behavior, such as flying an airplane, learning to 
read, or composing a song, led educational psychologists to theorize about mental 
structures and processes (p. 6). Early information processing theorist George Katona 
(1940) sought to understand "the complicated learning process, which ... appears to be 
described rather poorly as the establishment or a bond between a stimulus and a 
response" (p. 5). His work was inspired by Gestalt psychologists who were interested in 
the role of insight and the wholeness of experience, ideas anathema to behaviorists. Also 
challenging behaviorist conventions was the work oflinguist Noam Chomsky (1972, 
1976). His ideas, described as nativist, gave evidence that the mind was genetically 
predisposed to learn language, an argument that flew in the face of the behaviorist view 
ofthe mind as a "blank slate." 
While information processing theory had its roots in Gestalt and nativist 
psychology, its flowering would coincide with development of computer science. 
Anderson (2000) states: "The direct influence of computer-based theories on cognitive 
psychology has always been minimal. The indirect influence, however, has been 
enormous" (p. 11). Rather than the direct application of computer science to cognitive 
psychology, computer science has indirectly influenced cognitive psychology through 
computer-based metaphors. Simply put, "Behaviorists used the switchboard and 
information processing theorists used the computer" as their driving metaphor (Reynolds 
et aI., 1996, p. 102). 
Computers have been regarded as productive metaphor for humans: 
Computers perform cognitive tasks by processing information - taking symbols as 
input, applying operators to input, and producing output - so it follows that 
perhaps humans are information processors. (Mayer, 1996, p. 153) 
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The metaphor of humans as information processors is significantly different from 
the behaviorist metaphor of humans as merely responders to stimuli because it seeks to 
identify and explain internal cognitive structures and processes. In this search to identify 
cognitive structure and processes, information processing theory has drawn specific 
metaphors from computer science. Mayer (1996) categorizes these metaphors according 
to their views of the mind, cognition and learning. I will consider each one in tum, 
highlighting the most important ideas associated with it. 
1) The mind is an information processing system. Just as a computer has 
hardware, the mind has memory systems that store information. Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1968) classically described the configuration of this cognitive architecture as sensory 
memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory. 
Also called the sensory register, sensory memory is the first place stimuli enter 
the information processing system. Sensory memory is characterized by its rapid decay. 
Visual information decays in just 0.5 to 1.0 second; auditory information decays in 3.0 to 
4.0 seconds - long enough for it to be selected for continued processing in working 
memory (Leahy & Harris, 1997). 
Short-term memory is now most often referred to as working memory (WM). 
WM is analogous to awareness or consciousness (Gagne et aI., 1993; Sweller, van 
Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). WM has a limited capacity, holding 7±2 units of 
information (Miller, 1956), which decays within about 15 to 30 seconds (Brown, 1958; 
Peterson & Peterson, 1959). WM functions as a "mental workspace ... an internal notepad 
or blackboard" (Gagne et aI., 1993, p. 41). Information from sensory memory or retrieved 
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from long-tenn memory can be manipulated and/or altered on this "internal blackboard" 
and then stored in long-term memory for later use. 
Long-term memory (L TM) is the final destination for information in the 
processing system. Unlike sensory memory and WM, L TM has a virtually unlimited 
capacity and durability. There seems to be no limit to the amount of information stored in 
L TM and infonnation in L TM is very stable and may in fact remain there for an entire 
lifetime (pashler & Carrier, 1996). 
2) Cognition is the application of cognitive processes. Just as computers use 
software, humans use cognitive programs to process information. Three important types 
of cognitive processes identified by infonnation processing are encoding, retrieval, and 
metacognition. 
Encoding is the cognitive process of transferring information in WM to L TM 
(Bruning et aI., 1999). There are several sub processes under the general term of 
encoding. One type of encoding is rehearsal. Rehearsal is the repetition of information in 
WM. One can rehearse a list of states and capitals to the point that it enters L TM, at least 
for a while. Rehearsal is an inefficient and unreliable method of encoding (McKeown & 
Curtis, 1987). Organization is a more efficient and effective method of encoding by 
"clustering related items of content into categories or patterns that illustrate relationships" 
(Eggen & Kauchak, 2001, p. 274). A student who rewrites her notes in a hierarchical 
outline to aid memorization is employing organization. 
Elaboration is a method of encoding in which new knowledge is explicitly related 
to existing knowledge. Generally, elaboration is the encoding of new concepts on the 
foundation of existing concepts. For example, before teaching a new unit on pronouns, a 
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teacher would bring the existing concept of noun into WM and relate the new concept to 
it. This type of elaboration is referred to as schema activation (Pearson, 1984). More 
specifically, the art of mnemonics is elaborative because it relates new knowledge to 
existing images or ideas. A student can encode the definition "abstruse: difficult to 
understand" by relating it to an image of a man named Abe reading a truce to a man who 
doesn't understand it. A student might recall the names of the five Great Lakes by 
remembering the mnemonic acrostic HOMES. Notice that this is also a form of 
organization. 
Retrieval is the pulling of information from L TM back into WM. Cognitive 
psychologists consider retrieval as a process of either recall or recognition. If students 
have learned some basic history ofthe Roman Empire they might be asked, "Was Nero 
emperor when Rome burned?" This question asks the students to recognize information 
stored in LTM. The question, "Who was emperor when Rome burned?" asks the students 
to recall the same information. In either case, this view of retrieval is directly analogous 
to computer processing systems - information is stored in one form in which it remains 
until it is brought again in the same form into WM. 
However, retrieval can instead be considered as a reconstruction. Based on 
memories of voting in elections, people can construct false memories of voting in 
elections they did not (Loftus, 1993). Information incongruent with one's self-concept 
will be reconstructed in WM distorted or elaborated to be consistent with self-concept 
(Welch-Ross, 1995). The reconstructive nature of retrieval will be a key concept 
discussed in this paper. 
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Metacognition has been divided into two sub-areas, 1) one's awareness of 
cognitive processes and 2) one's control over those processes (Bruning et al., 1999). Two 
important types of metacognition are meta-attention and metamemory. An easily 
distracted student may choose to sit close to the front so he can only see the teacher and 
the chalkboard. This learner has an awareness and control over his process of attention 
and has developed and implemented strategies to direct his attention to a goal. A student 
with a lot of material to memorize might speak it aloud to herself or discuss it with a peer 
because she knows she remembers things she hears. This student is exhibiting 
metamemory, an awareness and control of her encoding processes. 
3) Learning is knowledge acquisition Just as computers rely on the input of 
transmission of data, human learning relies on the "transmission of symbols" (Mayer, 
1996, p. 155). Because of this view of knowledge, information processing describes a 
moderately active learner. Information processing ascribes a host of activities to the 
learner, such as encoding, retrieval, meta-attention and metamemory. With its focus on 
these internal cognitive processes, one must conclude that information processing 
describes a learner more active than the purely passive response strengthening of 
behaviorism. 
However, information processing still views the learner as the receiver of a 
transmission of symbols and this view places restraints on the learner's activities. The 
"rigid cognitive architecture" of information processing is not open to the influence of 
emotion, motivation, and the constructive and reconstructive view of learning and 
memory (Mayer, 1996 p. 157). To find the connections between cognitive structure and 
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processes of infonnation processing and the constructivist view of knowledge will be the 
primary concern of this paper. 
Infonnation processing has had an enonnous and beneficial influence on 
educational psychology. Primarily, it loosened the "strangle hold" of behaviorism 
(Mayer, 1996, p. 153), freeing educational psychologists to study cognitive structures and 
processes. Descriptions of memory stores have helped teachers and students overcome 
the limitations of working memory. Descriptions of cognitive processes such as encoding 
and retrieval have helped learners be more effective and efficient in their learning 
activities. Descriptions of metacognitive processes have especially emphasized the 
activities of learners and given them strategies to improve their activities. 
However, infonnation processing has important limitations, which need to be 
identified. Primarily the computer metaphor, which has been key to infonnation 
processing's advances, has some serious drawbacks. After all, a computer is a machine 
and a human is not. Literally comparing learning with computing "is most consistent with 
the view of learning as a passive, atomistic, and mechanical process" (Mayer, 1996, p. 
153). In this way infonnation processing still shares limitations with the behaviorist 
metaphor it replaced. 
Furthennore a computer may acquire new data or programs, but it cannot grow or 
develop in the manner that an organism does. "Machines neither can reflect on or 
reconceptualize past knowledge nor have passionate feelings about learning" (Reynolds 
et aI., 1996, p. 102). Any machine-based metaphor is likely to neglect the important role 
of emotion and past experiences on learning. Finally, though computers can be networked 
to share data, this will never be an adequate metaphor for the complex social 
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relationships of humans. These social functions, at the very least, exert tremendous 
influence on learning as described by Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and social constructivists. 
Others, such as the advocates of situated cognition characterized by Derry (1992), 
suggest that learning can only be described as a social, rather than individual, 
phenomenon. These limitations of information processing will be a major focus of this 
paper. 
Constructivism 
Mayer (1996) describes constructivism as educational psychology's third metaphor 
(following behaviorism and information processing), which became widely accepted in 
the 1980's and 1990's, though it had early roots in philosophy and psychology, as this 
paper will describe. Constructivism is currently a "hot topic" in educational psychology 
with many distinct schools vying for ideological supremacy (Mayer, 1996, p. 151). Derry 
(1992) identifies three types of constructivism while Bruning et al. (1999) identifies three 
others. Steffe & Gale (1995) identify no less than six different types of constructivism. 
Despite the abundance of varieties, Eggen and Kauchak (2001, p. 294-95) list four 
characteristics common to most constructivist views: 
1) Learners construct understanding. The earlier school of behaviorism viewed 
learners merely as recorders of knowledge (Mayer, 1996). According to influential 
behaviorist E.B Thorndike, after repeated exposure to a stimulus the associated response 
becomes, "stamped in." The later view of information processing theory accounted for 
the impact of cognitive constructs such as attention, metacognition, and working memory 
on the processing of stimuli. However, according to constructivist views, learners are not 
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recording or acquiring others' knowledge, but constructing their own knowledge 
(Phillips, 2000). 
2) New learning depends on current understanding. The important role of background 
knowledge in knowledge construction has been most fully described by schema theorists 
working from the constructivist perspective (Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Bartlett, 1932; 
Bransford & lohnson, 1972; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Their work is reviewed fully in 
the following chapter. 
3) Learning is facilitated by social interaction. In the constructivist view, teachers are 
not response strengtheners or knowledge sources. Instead, according to Mayer (1996), 
teachers are "cognitive guides" who use more social methods such as discussion and 
guided discovery to help learners construct understanding (p. 154). 
4) Meaningful learning occurs within authentic learning tasks. A writing lesson based 
on constructivist principles would relate realistically to the students' background and 
current experiences rather than focus on isolated drill and practice. For example students 
engaged in meaningful and authentic tasks have written to a major oil company regarding 
an oil leak in a local bay, interviewed adult family members about their childhood 
(Needles & Knapp, 1994) or had their work published in school newspaper or class 
journal (Hudson, 1988). 
The Individual Construction of Knowledge 
Knowledge construction as it occurs in the individual is primarily referred to as 
cognitive constructivism (Eggen & Kauchak, 2001). In this sense knowledge construction 
is seen as cognitive, or "in the head" of individual learners, rather than as a social 
phenomenon. Derry (1992) describes cognitive constructivism as primarily concerned 
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with the use of schemata in reading; however, in a broader sense described by Piaget 
(1952, 1959, 1970) cognitive constructivism concerns the experiences and development 
of the learner. 
Cognitive constructivism's interest in the development of the learner has led to an 
alternative name of endogenous constructivism (Bruning et aI., 1999). In this sense 
endogenous constructivism is a constructivism that originates and grows from within the 
individual. It couches constructivism in an organic or biological metaphor; hence the 
focus on development. 
The most well known aspect of this endogenous approach is Piaget's description 
of the stages of development, which describe the qualitative changes in children's 
thinking as they develop into adults. A cognitive or endogenous constructivist approach 
would strive to make learning compatible with the learner's cognitive development. Also 
characteristic ofthe endogenous approach is Piaget's idea of cognitive equilibrium (1952, 
1959). Piaget's concept of equilibrium suggests that individuals construct knowledge to 
maintain "internal coherence" (Bruning et aI., 1999, p. 216). When new knowledge does 
not fit into existing schemes, equilibrium is disrupted driving the learner to assimilate 
new knowledge into existing schemes or accommodate schemes to fit the new 
knowledge. Here we see the organic nature of cognitive constructivism: the learner tries 
to maintain equilibrium in its knowledge systems just as any organism tries to maintain 
equilibrium in its physical systems. 
The Social Construction of Knowledge 
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1978, 1986) developed a more socially 
oriented constructivist perspective. He asserted that cognition is first a social and 
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secondly an individual phenomenon stating, "The social dimension of consciousness is 
primary in fact and time. The individual dimension is derivative and secondary" 
(Vygotsky, 1979, p. 30). He believed knowledge is primarily constructed in a social 
experience, typically that of adult to child or expert to novice. That experience is bound, 
not only by the individual differences between the expert and novice, but also by the 
language and culture in which they are immersed (Fowler, 1994; Rogoff, 1990). The 
knowledge acquired by the novice in that specific social experience is later applied in a 
broader context (Bredo, 1997). Thus Vygotsky's social constructivist perspective would 
lean more toward the experience centered perspective than Piaget's individual 
constructivist perspective, which tends to be more mind centered (Reynolds et aI., 1996). 
Interestingly, Bruning et aI. (1999) describe this social constructivism as 
"dialectical constructivism" (p. 217). This term harkens back to the philosophy of G. W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831), which can give insight into the social constructivist perspective. 
Hegel saw objective truth as a dialectic evolution of thesis, to antithesis, to synthesis. An 
idea, called a thesis, implies it opposite, called an antithesis. From this relation of 
opposites emerges a "higher unifying concept, the synthesis." This synthesis becomes the 
next thesis and the whole process continues indefinitely (Clark, 195712000, p. 344). 
Consider the knowledge ofthe expert as the thesis, and the novice's lack of 
knowledge as the antithesis. When these interact in a social experience, the novice's new 
knowledge, the synthesis, is constructed. Notice it is not a passive transmission of 
knowledge of expert to novice like a behaviorist or information processing approach 
would imply; this Hegelian perspective helps us to the see the constructivist ingredient to 
Vygotsky's ideas. Another interesting point from this line of thought is that the expert 
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knowledge, the original thesis, is also swept up into the new synthesis. That leads us to 
question, how are experts, teachers and adults, changed by the social experience 
described by Vygotsky? 
The most influential ofVygotsky's ideas has been the zone of proximal 
development (ZPD) and its implication of instructional scaffolding. The ZPD is the range 
of cognitive performance in which a novice can be successful only with the help of an 
expert. Cognitive tasks beneath the ZPD can be performed independently while tasks 
beyond the ZPD cannot be completed even with the help of an expert. The help that an 
expert gives a novice has been described as instructional scaffolding. Just as a physical 
scaffold consists of rungs stretched across empty space to a new destination, an 
instructional scaffold gives rungs of assistance so that learners can work themselves to a 
new place of cognitive development. The rungs must be the appropriate distance apart. If 
they are too close, if too much help is given, no growth can occur. If they are too far 
apart, ifnot enough help is given, likewise no growth will occur. The importance of the 
expert in Vygotsky's thinking gives a clearer and more prominent role to teachers than is 
typically seen from an individual constructivist view. 
Schema Theory 
It was F.C. Bartlett's book Remembering, (1932) which introduced the term 
"schema" into experimental psychology. (It should be noted and will be discussed later 
that Immanuel Kant actually coined the term in his philosophical writings nearly 150 
years earlier.) Bartlett's idea of the schema is best characterized by his work with the 
story "The War of the Ghosts." In this experiment, he asked middleclass Englishmen to 
read a Native American folk tale. The tale is full of details of Native American life such 
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as place names, canoes, and bows and arrows. However, there is also a supernatural 
element. In the tale, a young Indian warrior accompanies a group of ghost warriors in an 
attack on other ghosts. Though initially unaware of his injury, the young warrior is 
mortally wounded. He returns to his home and dies after "something black" comes from 
his mouth. After reading the story twice, subjects were asked to reproduce the story 
following the original as closely as possible. 
The reproductions exhibited many errors; but there was a pattern within the 
inconsistencies so that "the subjects were distorting the story to fit with their own cultural 
stereotypes" (Anderson, 1980, p. 153). For example, a subject changed "canoe" into 
"boat," or "paddling" to "rowing," terms more familiar to the subjects at the time. 
However, even more intriguing was the fact that the subjects sometimes changed the 
whole message or meaning ofthe story to fit their sensibilities. For example the subjects 
sometimes changed the mortal warrior into "more of a hero" and to be "the centre of 
interest at the end" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 69), rather than to portray him as the story did, as 
an incidental casualty in a supernatural battle. Perhaps this was in keeping with their 
more individualistic Western mindset. At any rate, the subjects' understanding was a 
combination of their background knowledge and the story. Bartlett described this through 
the operation of a schema, a term he immediately decried as "at once too definite and too 
sketchy" (p. 201). He would have preferred to describe the phenomenon as an "active 
developing pattern" or "organized setting" (p. 201). 
Critics of schema theory explain that schemata have been "variously defined by 
comparison to stereotypes, prototypes, templates, scripts, plans, and grammars" (Sadoski 
et aI., 1991, p. 466). All of these terms have a rigidity that Bartlett would not have 
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accepted. Scripts, plans and grammars are written down, codified, and can be placed in a 
filing cabinet or storehouse. Bartlett's (1932) schema "refers to an active organisation of 
past reactions" (p. 201) that are "living, constantly developing, affected by every 
incoming sensational experience of a given kind. The storehouse notion is as far removed 
from this as it well could be" (p. 200). Bartlett's worked helped educational psychology 
to understand "readers were not in the passive role of merely pulling information rotely 
from the printed page. Rather readers were active as they drew on their background 
knowledge ... to determine the meaning of the text" (Hiebart & Raphael, 1996, p. 554). 
Hiebart and Raphael (1996) explain that the constructivist perspective was the 
foundation of the two major lines of research in schema theory, one by R.C. Anderson 
and one by J.D. Bransford. Anderson's work (for summary see Anderson & Pearson, 
1984) involved assigning perspectives to readers before they read a text. For example 
before reading a narrative description of the inside of a house, readers were assigned the 
perspective of a burglar or of a home buyer. The assigned perspective greatly influenced 
what subjects perceived and remembered. Bransford's research (Bransford & Johnson, 
1972) involved the use of ambiguous texts. For example a text might describe the process 
of washing clothes, without using words such as "clothes, washing machine" or "soap." 
The study revealed that if subjects did not invoke the appropriate schema, they had 
difficulty recalling and comprehending the text. From this constructivist perspective, 
schema theory has contributed to our understanding of the important role of background 
knowledge in the construction of new knowledge (Nuthall, 1999). 
Though initially developed in opposition to the mechanistic tendencies of 
information processing theory (Reynolds et aI., 1996) schema theory has been researched 
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from the information processing perspective. Research of schemata from this perspective 
has focused on topics such as model building, learning text information (Hiebart & 
Raphael, 1996) and problem solving. In these areas, particularly problem solving, "the 
term [ schema] has been used in a far more restrictive sense" (Mayer, 1987, p. 329) by 
which their acquisition is described as "learning to categorize problems and apply 
particular rules" (Voss & Wiley, 1995, p.157). For example, when confronted with a 
math problem, "65-28=?," a student would categorize and solve it by using a schema for 
"borrowing" in a subtraction problem. The idea that schemata are procedures we develop 
and use to process symbols obviously has its origins in information processing theory. 
Another interesting relationship between schema theory and information processing 
theory deals with cognitive architecture. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) define schemata 
as "the generic concept of memory" that can "embed one within another" (p. 101). Gagne 
et al. (1993) describe how one's schema for "fast-food restaurant" could contain 
propositions such as "The food is cheap" or "The fries are good," images of menu boards 
and counters, and linear orderings such as "order, pay, eat, leave." One schema may 
actually bundle a large number of single elements. As described by cognitive load theory 
(Sweller et aI., 1998), these schemata may bring many single elements into working 
memory as a single unit, thus freeing limited working memory resources for other tasks. 
For example a person in a fast food restaurant with a well-developed schema could 
devote attention to secondary matters such as food specials or contests, while someone 
without such as schema (one who has never been in a fast food restaurant) would have to 
devote working memory to grasp the basic order of this "dining experience." 
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Though often criticized for its vagueness and its lack of supporting empirical 
evidence (Sadoski et aI., 1991; Reynolds et aI., 1996) schema theory has interested 
educational psychologists for decades primarily because of its "extraordinary power in 
accounting for memory and other cognitive phenomena" (Bruning et aI., 1999, p. 56). 
Schema theory has helped teachers to appreciate the importance of background 
knowledge in learning. Teachers know that students come to their lessons with a wide 
variety of background knowledge that affects perception and comprehension of new 
knowledge. Teachers also know the importance of building a common level of 
background knowledge that will facilitate the learning of new knowledge. 
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge 
Declarative knowledge is "knowledge of facts, definitions, procedures and rules" 
(Eggen & Kauchak, 2001, p. 263), whereas procedural knowledge is knowledge of how 
to perform tasks (Anderson, 2000). Declarative knowledge is of a purely cognitive, rather 
than physical, nature. In addition to verbal propositions, declarative knowledge can be 
represented in images and linear orderings (Gagne et aI., 1993, p. 59). Declarative 
knowledge is static, quickly acquired, and easily modified (Gagne et aI., 1993, p. 91). 
Declarative knowledge can be "easily manipulated in working memory, allowing for 
reflection" and can "facilitate the thinking of related ideas" (p. 110). 
These thought processes occur because the basic representations of declarative 
knowledge are integrated into schemata (Eggen & Kauchak, 2001; Gagne et aI., 1993). 
Gagne et al. (1993) describe how a schema for "fast-food restaurant" is composed of 
elemental propositions, images, and linear orderings. The schema contains propositions 
such as "The food is cheap" or "The fries are good," images of menu boards and 
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counters; linear orderings such as "order, pay, eat leave." As described by cognitive load 
theory (Sweller et aI., 1998), limited working memory resources are freed for other tasks 
when declarative knowledge is integrated into schema, not isolated in disconnected bits. 
Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to perform tasks which may be 
cognitive, physical, or a blend of both (Anderson, 2000). Procedural knowledge provides 
"rapid execution of a set of actions under well-specified conditions" (Gagne et aI., 1993, 
p. 110). In contrast to declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge is dynamic, acquired 
slowly, and difficult to modify once it reaches automaticity (p. 91). Automaticity is the 
third and final stage in the development of procedural knowledge as described below. 
Procedural knowledge is developed in three stages: declarative, associative and 
automatic (Gagne et aI., 1993). In the declarative stage, the learner acquires basic verbal 
or psychomotor knowledge of the procedure: "To operate a manual transmission, I 
simultaneously press the clutch to the floor and ease up on the gas pedal while I shift 
gears, then I release the clutch and reapply pressure to the gas pedal." In the associative 
stage, the learner can perform the task, but must concentrate on the procedure. In the 
associative stage the learner must pay attention (use working memory resources) to 
complete the task. For the safety of all involved, a driver of a manual transmission in this 
stage should not attempt to engage in conversation! Finally, procedural knowledge 
reaches a level of automaticity; little or no conscious effort is required to successfully 
complete the procedure. A driver in this stage can eat, drink, listen to the radio and talk 
while shifting gears. 
Much procedural knowledge cannot be expressed verbally, such as how to ride a 
bike (Anderson, 2000). However, if possible, procedural knowledge can be verbally 
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represented as "if. .. then" contingency statements in which the "if' part of a statement 
signifies the condition and the "then" signifies the action to be taken (Gagne et aI., 1993, 
p. 90). For example, when solving a two-digit subtraction problem, "If the top number is 
less than the bottom number, then I can 'borrow' from the number in the next column to 
the left." Describing procedural knowledge through "if ... then" statements leads to an 
interesting point of confusion that this paper will attempt to clarify. 
The distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge is very similar to 
the distinction between the information processing and constructivist perspective on 
schema theory as described in the preceding section. Constructivists have seen schemata 
as background knowledge, declarative knowledge, which affects the construction of 
meaning. Information processing theorists have seen schemata as rules we apply to 
perform tasks, or procedural knowledge. This view of schemata as rules has been 
described as a "far more restrictive sense" (Mayer, 1987, p. 329) than the constructivist 
view. Yet I will argue this "restricted" view actually encompasses the constructivist view, 
because, as this paper will show, all schemata are rule-based. In terms of knowledge, all 
knowledge, whether described as declarative or procedural, is ultimately procedural or 
rule-based. 
Notice that procedural knowledge is developed in three stages: declarative, 
associative and automatic (Eggen & Kauchak, 2001). Declarative knowledge is the first 
stage of developing procedural knowledge. One must have declarative knowledge of the 
concept "noun" before one can complete the procedure: "Circle the nouns in the 
following sentence." One must have declarative knowledge of "borrowing" in a 
subtraction problem before one can complete the procedure: "65-28=?" Declarative 
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knowledge is simply a part of procedural knowledge. Furthermore, declarative 
knowledge is seen as static in that "it cannot be activated until a production fires" via 
procedural knowledge (Gagne et aI., 1993, p. 110). In other words declarative knowledge 
only exists as it relates to some procedure or activity of the individual. One can only 
declare knowledge of "borrowing" if asked to do so or given a task which requires it. 
Procedure is the beginning and end of knowledge. Declarative knowledge isjust a 
component of a procedure. 
In other words, declarative knowledge only exists within the broader context of 
procedural knowledge. If this is true, then all knowledge is ultimately procedural or rule-
based and can be "formally represented as IF-THEN contingency statements" (Gagne et 
aI., 1993, p. 90). This is a claim that this paper will make. This paper will suggest that a 
schema can be linguistically expressed as an "if. .. then" statement, which I call a 
"hypothetical inference" following the American philosopher Charles Peirce (1839-
1914). To describe all knowledge as hypothetical inference will bridge the gap between 
declarative and procedural knowledge and unify the information processing and 
constructivist perspectives on schema theory. 
In summary, the ideas of declarative and procedural knowledge provide specific 
implications for instruction. It implies teachers should distinguish between lessons that 
attempt to merely build declarative knowledge and those that also seek to build 
procedural knowledge. If the goal is to build declarative knowledge, teachers should 
insure that this new knowledge is integrated into existing schemata or background 
knowledge. If the goal is to build procedural knowledge, it implies teachers should 
identify and teach the declarative knowledge that is the first step in the procedure. It also 
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implies that students need a lot of opportunity to practice new procedures so they can 
progress through the associative and to the automatic stage. But if all knowledge is 
ultimately procedural as this paper will argue, then teachers should teach all knowledge, 
whether it is considered declarative or procedural, through student activity. 
Concept Theory 
A concept can be quickly defined as a category. Examples of concepts are "dog, 
democracy, love, tool," etc. Concepts are hierarchical so that the concept "golden 
retriever" belongs under the concept "dog" which in turn could be placed under the 
concept "mammal" or "animal." The characteristics shared among all members of these 
concepts are the attributes. For example the attributes of the concept "mammal" are: 
animals that have hair or fur, give live birth, drink mother's milk etc. Obviously one can 
see that learning concepts is a large part of any student's education and therefore has 
been the subject of educational research early and often. 
Two broad perspectives have vied for dominance in the literature on concept 
learning. The first of these perspectives is one based in logic and verbal knowledge; these 
can be categorized as rule-based theories. The other of these two perspectives is based on 
visual memory; these are categorized as prototype or exemplar theories. It will be a major 
focus of this paper to show that both perspectives are indeed valid. Concepts are learned 
both through logic and perception, but ultimately they are all formed based on rules, rules 
we apply to our words and our perceptions. 
Educational psychology's first descriptions of concept learning were rule-based. 
The work of Bruner et al. (1956) was seminal in this regard. These psychologists were 
primarily interested in concept identification. The researchers had predetermined a novel 
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concept such as "red four sided figures." They would show the subjects a group of 
geometric shapes of various sizes and colors containing at least one example of the 
predetermined concept. The subjects would then make hypotheses about the concept and 
test their hypotheses by asking the researchers yes or no questions. In this way the 
researchers could determine how the subjects went about acquiring concepts. They found 
the subjects would quickly form rules such as, "If the object is not red then it is not an 
example" which they would apply and refine until arriving at all the essential attributes of 
the concept. 
These concept learning tasks and the concepts themselves seem artificial. After 
all, who has learned a category of "red four sided figures" which is so clearly defined and 
has no gray or fuzzy boundaries? Who has sat in a laboratory asking questions to learn 
concepts? More typically we learn concepts in the normal course of our lives without an 
expert to confirm or refute our every hypothesis. Also the concepts we learn are not so 
easily and logically defined. Consider the concept "chair." Is a stool an example? What 
about the driver's seat in a car? These kinds of questions led to the development of the 
prototype and exemplar theories of concept learning. 
Prototype theorists (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) suggest we identify examples of 
concepts, not by strict logical reasoning, but by a judgment of probability based on family 
resemblance. They would say rather than an abstract logical definition of chair, we have 
in our minds a prototype of chair, an analog mental construct based on and retaining 
characteristics of original sense experiences. This prototype is our "best instance" of the 
concept (Caelli & Moraglia, 1986). We probably recognize a stool as a chair because it 
has a family resemblance to our prototype of chair. After all it is a piece of furniture with 
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four legs used for sitting. Notice that a loveseat shares this logical list of attributes, but it 
would probably not be identified as an example of chair because it does not have a family 
resemblance. For prototype theorists this is evidence that we do not form and follow 
abstract logical rules but we make probability judgments based on sense experiences. 
One of the primary and important implications of prototypes is the exemplar theory of 
concept learning. Tenneyson and Cocchiarella (1986) have discussed how important it is 
for teachers to display concept exemplars and describe attributes or question students to 
discover attributes. 
In reaction to the early development of prototype and exemplar theories, Bourne 
(1982) attempted to reestablish the validity of rule-based theories of concept learning. In 
his study he showed that when strictly rule-based concepts are artificially learned in a 
laboratory, it can still yield phenomena just like the "best instance" or typicality 
phenomena claimed as evidence of prototype theory. Perhaps, as this paper will suggest, 
all concept learning is ultimately rule-driven. 
Prototype and exemplar theories make the most sense when discussing simple 
observable non-verbal concepts, such as "dog" or "bird." But it does not make as much 
sense to say we have prototypes of "love" or "democracy." Strictly rule-based theories 
better account for these verbal concepts. Immanuel Kant defined a concept as "a rule that 
allows you to unite separately given perceptual materials together under one label" 
(Kitcher, 1990, p. 195). For Kant a rule was an over-arching construct, it transcended the 
mere analog retention of images or prototypes. A typical prototype theory of concepts 
relies on recording of images. However, images are not merely passively recorded on the 
mind; they are actively constructed and reconstructed according to rules. 
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Therefore prototype and exemplar theories are just as rule-driven as an explicitly 
rule-driven theory. Here is why. The idea behind prototype or exemplar theories is that by 
observing a number of dogs, or even just one that makes an impression on us, we retain 
that image as a prototype. We then use this prototype to judge other animals we 
encounter so that we can classify them as dog or not dog by "family resemblance." If our 
prototype of dog looks like a golden retriever, then we would be quick to classifY a 
yellow lab wearing a red bandana as dog because it closely matches our prototype, while 
we may be hesitant to classifY a Chihuahua as a dog since it is so different. That is all 
very well and good. But we can't think that we will continue to use our prototype for a 
dog like this, like we were pulling a picture out of a file drawer. Our prototype is likely to 
change with new experience; the next time we use it, it may be a new combination of that 
first golden retriever wearing the red bandana of that second yellow lab. How can this be? 
The prototype was not really the image, it was the rule we followed to construct 
the image. Recorded images are not subject change (it was not possible to record the 
golden retriever wearing the bandana because it never existed), but the rules we follow to 
construct images are evolving. Our prototypes, like any memories or imaginations, are 
not static recordings (or "analogs" as suggested by Rosch & Mervis, 1975), but 
constructions and reconstructions. The prototype image does not sit in our mind like a 
picture waiting to be pulled from a file drawer. What sits in our mind is the schema, the 
directions, the blueprint, the rule for constructing the image. Kant described the schema 
as "the part of the concept that permits perceptual recognition ... or the rule for 
constructing images of concept instances" (Kitcher, 1990, p. 196). In summary, rule-
driven, prototypical, and exemplar theories of concepts are all ultimately rule-driven. 
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This paper will show that Kant's idea of concept and schema give us the common ground 
of a rule-driven theory while still allowing for differences in verbal and non-verbal 
concepts. 
Summary 
This existing literature of cognition has extended educational psychology's ability 
to describe and prescribe learning experiences. The various perspectives share important 
ideas that have greatly impacted educational practices. Chief among these is the idea that 
students are not merely passive responders to stimuli, but they are active processors and 
constructors of knowledge. The literature of cognition is an attempt to describe these 
internal cognitive activities in a way that can lead to improved educational practice. 
Though largely successful, the literature still exhibits vagueness and lack of cohesion as 
described in the first chapter of this paper. 
This second chapter further demonstrated the incompatibility within and among 
these views. One can refer to the debate between individual and social constructivism, 
rule-based and prototype theories of concept learning, or schemata as declarative or 
procedural knowledge as evidence of this incompatibility. The research that follows will 
demonstrate that many of these incompatibilities stern from a single core issue: is 
learning experience centered or mind centered? (Reynolds et aI., 1996). The next chapter 
of this paper will attempt to research this question, tracing it from ancient to modem 
philosophy and from early to contemporary psychology. The research will show that 
some key ideas of philosopher Immanuel Kant can answer this question and alleviate the 
vagueness and lack of cohesion in the literature of cognition. 
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Chapter III: Research 
Introduction 
A paper describing an experimental or empirical study would at this point describe 
the study's subjects, materials, methods, etc. This paper describes a study that is 
theoretical rather than experimental or empirical. Because ofthis difference, the research 
will differ as well. This paper looks backward to the origins of psychology, to see if the 
great minds of the past can help clarify and unify current cognitive theory. This study's 
subjects will be those great minds of philosophy and psychology. This study's methods, 
though not experimental or empirical, are hopefully no less rigorous. The methods 
employed are more historical than scientific, unearthing the origins and tracing the 
lineage of ideas that have been foundational for educational psychology. 
This research will define empiricism and rationalism and trace their development 
through the history of philosophy and psychology. Like the very measures of time and 
space that implicitly guide our science (though we consider them only a tool in our 
hands), the foundational ideas of empiricism and rationalism guide our educational 
psychology. Particular attention will be paid to how these two schools of thought 
established oppositional views of the mind, learning, and the possibility of knowledge. 
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant will be presented as a reconciliation of these two 
schools of thought. In Chapter 4, titled "Results," Kant's philosophy will help 
psychology reconcile these two views in a unified theory of cognition. 
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Empiricism and Rationalism in Philosophy 
Consider Raphael's (1483-1520) famous painting, "The School Athens" (1509-
1510). It portrays some of the greatest thinkers of Western civilization standing in a 
colonnade of Athens. In the spirit of the Renaissance, Raphael wished to depict Western 
civilization's outgrowth from its Greek roots. Most expressions of Western culture can 
find its origin in the Greeks, and psychology is no exception. In the very center of the 
painting stand two figures. One, the older, is raising a solitary finger toward the sky; the 
younger is extending his splayed fingers out toward the viewer. The older is Plato; the 
younger is his student, Aristotle. Here, symbolized by these two men and their almost 
incidental gestures, lays the central question of knowledge: "How do we learn?" This 
question is central to philosophy and psychology alike. It is a question that has fascinated 
many great minds for thousands of years. 
Empiricism Rationalism 
View of Mind Passive mind Active mind 
Mind is a blank slate Mind has innate knowledge 
View of Involuntary association Voluntary act of will 
Learning 
Based on sense experience alone Based on logical thought alone 
View of Skeptical Dogmatic 
Possibility of 
Nothing is knowable Everything is knowable Knowledge 
Table 1: Empiricist and Rationalist Views of the Mind, Learning and the Possibility of Knowledge. 
Whose hand holds the answer? Is it Plato's one finger pointing upward or 
Aristotle's several fingers pointing out? Let Aristotle fingers represent empiricism. They 
are several fingers pointing out to the world because empiricism claims knowledge is 
based only in the accumulation of sense experiences. Let Plato's finger represent the 
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philosophy of rationalism. It is one finger pointing toward the heavens because 
rationalism claims knowledge is based only on the unity oflogical thought. Table 1 
depicts some contrasting characteristics of empiricism and rationalism as they view the 
mind, learning, and the possibility of knowledge. 
Teachers may feel this question of knowledge is antiquated or at the very least 
impractical. However, the answer to this question will determine how teachers plan 
lessons, organize classrooms, and write tests. To simply follow a textbook series is to 
simply suspend judgment and endorse the judgment of the textbook authors by default. It 
is better to decide that a philosophy of knowing, an epistemology, is so central to 
teaching it is worth the trouble of a little study. In other words, if one is to know how to 
teach, one must first know how to know. 
It is unfortunate that Aristotle represents empiricism in Raphael's painting 
because he was really the first one to try and synthesize empiricism and rationalism. 
Actually empiricism can trace its roots a few decades before Aristotle to the Greek 
philosopher Democritus. Science textbooks credit Democritus for developing the idea of 
the atom, but more importantly Democritus developed the idea of materialism - the idea 
that all reality is material. Think again about Aristotle's hand, it shows us the fingers and 
the space between them. That is the essence of materialism; there is matter and space, but 
nothing else. 
For Democritus there is one type of matter, the atom. For Thales there were four: 
fire, water, earth and air. For Mendeleyev there were ninety-four elements on a periodic 
table. "Whether there are four types or ninety-four is theoretically immateriaL .. All the 
great variety of common experience is to be derived from combination of these elements 
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[emphasis mine]" (Clark, 1957/2000, p. 37). The number does not matter (no pun 
intended), in the end a materialist agrees with Democritus. All reality is either matter or 
space; therefore, the qualitative differences we see can ultimately be reduced to quantity. 
Our knowledge can only come from sense experiences of matter, because matter is all 
that exists; this is the essence of empiricism. 
In "The School of Athens," Plato is pointing toward the heavens in an effort to 
direct our attention away from the material world of sense experiences, and towards the 
unified world of ideas. Plato developed his philosophy in direct opposition to empiricism 
and materialism. To Plato, the idea that matter was the ultimate reality was absurd. If 
reality was only matter, then it is true that we could only know things that are based on 
sense experiences. But, Plato argued, we have knowledge apart from sense experiences. 
For example, by reason we know that a circle is a two-dimensional figure in which all 
points are equidistant from the center. We know what a circle is only by reason and logic; 
we have never experienced a circle with our senses. We have sense experiences of things 
that are like circles or spheres such as a plate, the sun, or a ball. But these are not truly 
perfect (the plate has an imperfection) and unchanging (the ball may deflate), while our 
idea of circle is perfect and unchanging. Plato's philosophy thus makes our ideas more 
real than our sense experiences. We recognize a plate as circular because we already have 
an innate idea of circle. Likewise all sense experience is based on logical thought. Plato's 
ideas are the basis of rationalism. 
Very early in philosophy we have the beginnings of the conflict of empiricism and 
rationalism. As illustrated in Table 1 we have seen the conflict between pluralism and 
monism, between sense experience and logic. Reynolds et al. (1996) describe this conflict 
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as between experience centered and mind centered approaches. They place Democritus at 
the extreme pole of experience centered approaches and Plato at the extreme end of mind 
centered approaches. As stated earlier it was Aristotle who first tried to reconcile these 
disparate views of reality, the mind and learning. The middle path he developed was 
widely accepted and developed throughout the Middle Ages. However, to make 
Aristotle's, and later Kant's, synthesis more clear, I will continue to trace the 
development of empirical and rational extremes into the modem period. 
Empiricism was fully developed and popularized in England by men such as John 
Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776) who 
became collectively known as the British empiricists. They championed the idea that the 
mind has no innate ideas and that all thought is based on sense experience alone. In the 
words of John Locke (1690/1995): 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast 
store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost 
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this 
I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and 
from that, ultimately derives itself. (p. 59) 
Here we see the empiricist view of the mind and learning. The mind is "white 
paper," the "blank slate" known as the "tabula rasa," anything written on it (learned) is a 
unity derived from particular sense experiences. "According to the empiricist view, the 
mind grows through the progressive accumulation of sensory experiences" (Schultz & 
Schultz, 1987, p. 29). This "progressive accumulation" is learning by association; we 
associate the sense experiences of red, juicy, and sweet over and over again and form the 
idea of apple. 
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These empiricist views are seductively simple, especially to educators. If children 
come to us as blank slates that passively learn by association, all we need to do is 
carefully craft experiences to shape student behavior. We see here the origins of 
behaviorism, which is the most extreme psychological expression of empiricism (Clark, 
1957/2000, p. 341; Reynolds et aI., 1996). We will examine this more carefully as we 
trace empiricism in psychology. 
The British empiricists developed their views in opposition to the rationalism 
propagated on the European continent by men such as Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza 
(1632-1677), and Leibniz (1646-1716). Descartes was determined to find an absolutely 
objective foundation for thought. He dismissed the idea that sense experience or divine 
revelation could be this foundation since either could be later found in error. Like Plato, 
he decided that pure logic and reason alone could provide such a foundation. What could 
he know absolutely for certain without basing it on sense experience or divine revelation? 
Descartes proved, by logic alone, he could know that he exists. He doubted 
everything, except that he doubts. If he doubts, then he thinks. If he thinks, then he exists. 
This is his famous "cogito, ergo sum," translated, "I think, therefore I am." Prior to any 
sense experience (a priori) and apart from any divine revelation, he knew that he existed. 
From this foundation Descartes used logic alone to prove the existence of "God, 
geometric axioms, perfection and infinity" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 27). No doubt 
Descartes' views can be labeled as extremely mind centered. If empiricism leads to 
behaviorism, then the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes "culminates in the nativistic 
theory of perception and the Gestalt school of psychology" (p. 27). 
46 
Without exploring every intricacy of early modem philosophy, we can see that by 
Kant's time both empiricism and rationalism had reached dead ends. Rationalism may 
have found knowledge of abstract principles, but how could we gain knowledge of 
concrete individuals and history by reason alone? Empiricism may have found 
knowledge of sense experiences, but how can we gain knowledge of self, mathematics or 
science by sense experience alone? Are we to join with the rationalists and have absolute 
and perfect knowledge of abstract ideas that are utterly divorced from the material world? 
This would be like knowing calculus and never being able to use it. Or perhaps we should 
join the empiricists and gain perfect knowledge of our sense experiences but never be 
able to have any absolute or probable knowledge ofthem whatsoever? This would be like 
having the ability to count to a million but never being sure if 2+2=4. This was the choice 
that Immanuel Kant faced as described by Cornelius VanTil: 
Kant himself says that on the basis of empiricism we can have only brute facts 
and more brute facts but no systematic relation between them. He adds that on the 
basis of rationalism we would have only order, but it would be merely the idea of 
order without any ordering of facts. (Bahnsen, 1998, p. 344) 
Instead of merely choosing a side, Kant strove to synthesize these two views. What he 
did he labeled the "Copernican revolution" of philosophy. 
Kant's Synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism 
Both the empiricists and rationalists had the idea that objective reality was something 
outside of us. The nature of learning was to understand how our mind could conform to 
something outside of it. Think of objective reality like an apple and think of the mind as 
of those thin sheets of caramel one can wrap around the apple to make a caramel apple. 
The sheet of caramel conforms to the apple in the same way the empiricists and 
rationalists assumed the mind conforms to experience; they just differed as to how our 
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minds could conform to objective reality. The empiricists believed it could happen 
through sense experience, the rationalists through logic. 
Kant did not pick one of these sides, he turned the whole issue inside out, or perhaps 
it is best to say "outside in." The mind does not conform to experience, Kant said, but 
experience conforms to the mind. The mind is the apple of objective reality; experience is 
the sheet of caramel. Our minds shape experience. This is Kant's self-described 
"Copernican revolution" in philosophy. Copernicus revolutionized astronomy when he 
demonstrated that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the solar system. Kant 
revolutionized philosophy and psychology, when he demonstrated that our mind, not 
experience, is the center or foundation of knowledge. 
A further analogy may help explain the point. G. Haddon Clark (1957/2000) explains 
Kant's revolution with an analogy of jelly and a jelly jar. Think of a jelly jar sitting on a 
pantry shelf year after year. One year it experiences a sweet soupy sauce with chunks of 
red fruit floating in it; the next year it experiences a firmer dark purple substance with no 
fruit, the next year a bitter concoction with slices of peel. While each year the experience 
changes, one thing remains constant. The substance, no matter what color or texture or 
flavor, always has the same cylindrical shape and size. How could that be? Imagine the 
amazement of the jelly jar when it realizes that it, the jar itself, is the reason the substance 
always has the same size and shape (p. 313). The jelly (experience) conformed to the jar 
(mind). Experiences come and go, but the innate structure of the mind remains constant. 
Thus, Kant suggests, we can use experience to determine the innate structure of the mind. 
That innate structure of the mind can then be the firm foundation of knowledge, whereas 
experience and logic alone have failed. 
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All of this discussion about finding a firm basis of knowledge is of ultimate 
importance to philosophy and psychology. Table 2 depicts Kant's synthesis of 
empiricism's and rationalism's views of the mind, learning and the possibility of 
knowledge. 
Empiricism Kant Rationalism 
View of Mind Passive mind Interactive mind Active mind 
Mind is a blank slate Mind has innate structures Mind has innate knowledge 
that shape experience 
View of Involuntary association Construction Voluntary act ofwill 
Learning 
Based on sense Based on application of Based on logical thought 
experience alone thought to experience alone 
View of Skeptical Evolving Dogmatic 
Possibility of 
Nothing is knowable Some things are knowable Everything is knowable Knowledge 
.. . " Table 2: Empmclst, RatIOnalIst and KantIan VIews of the Mmd, Learnmg and the POSSIbIlIty of Knowledge 
Kant and Mind 
While an empirical mind is passive and a rational mind is active, a Kantian mind 
is interactive. An active mind of the rationalist claims innate knowledge of everything 
apart from experience, but, like the jelly jar could only learn of its shape by its experience 
of the jelly, a Kantian mind must have experience to gain knowledge of itself. A passive 
mind of the empiricist has only experience; it is a blank slate with no innate structure to 
mold experience. But jelly without a jar would simply spill all over the shelf and onto the 
floor. This difficulty forced the empiricists to at least allow the mind the innate structure 
of habit or association, but once one ascribes to the mind a structure of association, it is 
not really a "blank slate" anymore, is it? Nevertheless Kant proved there must be a 
structure that exists even before the structure of association. Before a mind can learn by 
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habit to associate two things, it must already know that they are two things and not just 
one. Before I can associate the movement of one billiard ball with the movement of 
another that strikes it, I must first know that they are two balls separated by space. 
Therefore, space is an innate structure of the mind that exists before experience that we 
can only gain knowledge of with experience. A Kantian mind is interactive in that it is 
acted upon and acts upon experience. In VanTil's opinion, Kant's view of the mind was 
revolutionary in that, "no one had ever conceived the idea that the mind itself was doing 
the ordering [of experience] even as it was doing the observing [of experience]" 
(Bahnsen, 1998 p. 344). 
Kant and Learning 
While empiricism views learning as involuntary association and rationalism views 
learning as a voluntary act of will through logic, "Kantian schematism implies ... 
constructivism" (Eco, 1997, p.89). What sits on the pantry shelf is the jelly jar and the 
jelly, there is no knowledge in either one alone but only in the relationship of the two. 
From a Kantian perspective, learning occurs, not from experience or mind alone, but 
from the relationship between the two. To use a "meatier" analogy from Cornelius Van 
Til, "Like a sausage-grinder, the mind of man form things into molds as it receives them. 
We never see pork or beef; we see only sausages that, according to the butcher's word, 
contain both. Thus we always make facts as much as we find them (emphasis mine)" 
(Bahnsen, 1998, p. 346). We cannot see the raw "pork and beef' of experience as the 
empiricists had hoped, nor are we free to prove facts apart from experience as the 
rationalists had hoped. 
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For Kant learning is constructed, in the sense that Beers (1987) explains that to see 
knowledge as constructed is to see knowledge as individually designed using common 
raw materials. When a house is constructed, the resulting structure depends on the 
background knowledge and activities of the builder and the nature of the materials 
provided. In the same way when knowledge is constructed, the resulting edifice depends 
on the background knowledge and activities of the mind and the provided experience. 
The link between Kant and constructivism and schema theory will be discussed more 
thoroughly when we examine how Kant's thought can unify and clarify cognitive 
learning theory. 
Kant and the Possibility of Knowledge 
While an empiricist view is skeptical and a rationalist view is dogmatic, Kant views 
knowledge as evolving. Kant validates the scientific method, yet allows the findings of 
the method to be revised. This is no easy task, for the empiricist view finds no firm basis 
for science. If the empiricists were right and we only have knowledge of fallible sense 
experiences, then science has no absolute knowledge of the material world. As Clark 
(1957/2000) paraphrases Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, "the 
indubitable experience we have of bodies never rises to the level of science; that is there 
are no general and unquestionable truths concerning bodies" (p. 289). Empiricism leads 
to skepticism. While a rationalistic view would allow us to know for certain that 2+2=4, 
it could never allow our knowledge, based on the unchanging laws of logic, to be revised 
by new experiences. If the rationalists are right and we can only know through logic and 
reason, we can reason to absolutes of God and geometry but never have any experience 
of them. Rationalism leads to dogmatism. 
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If empiricism says we can know nothing and rationalism says we can know 
everything, then Kant's view is that we can know some things. In Kant's view, science is 
not something outside of us we discover, nor is it something only inside of us we realize. 
Science is experience arranged by the mind of man. Scientific knowledge is based on a 
firm foundation (the innate structure of human thought) yet it is open to revision by new 
experiences. After Columbus, the world did not change shape from flat to spherical. After 
Copernicus, the earth and sun did not physically change places. Any scientific 
"discovery" is in fact just a new way of thinking about what was there all along. In this 
way science, like all learning, is constructive; it exists in the relationship of the mind 
applied to experience. VanTil explains this relationship: 
Facts cannot be observed, argues Kant, except that they are observed as being 
incorporated into systematic arrangement. So it is the mind itself that imposes it 
categories of substance and causality upon nature even as it observes nature. Nature 
means causally related facts. And causally related facts are brute facts observed and 
arranged by the mind of man. (Bahnsen, 1998, p. 344) 
Empiricism and Rationalism in Psychology 
To see the influences of empiricism and rationalism in psychology it might seem 
helpful to first answer the question, what is psychology? But this is not the most helpful 
starting point because any definition of psychology is likely to assume the dominance of 
one of these two views. One can see the influence of empiricism in British psychologist 
William McDougall's 1908 definition of psychology as the "science of behavior" (Schultz 
& Schultz, 1987, p. 3). Does a strictly etymological definition of psychology as the 
"study of the mind" defer to a rationalistic view? After all, a study does not have to be a 
science and the mind is not directly observable through sense experience like a kidney or 
a flower. 
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"The distinction between modem psychology and its antecedents has less to do with 
the kinds of questions asked about human nature than with the methods used to seek the 
answers" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 1). So both philosophy and psychology are 
concerned with the nature of the mind, learning and the possibility of knowledge, but 
they use different methods to reach those answers. What are these different methods? 
Schultz and Schultz (1987) suggest philosophy uses "speculation, intuition, and 
generalization" while psychology uses the "the tools and methods of science" 
specifically, "controlled observation and experimentation" (p. 1). If it really is that simple 
a division, we could describe philosophy as rationalistic and psychology as empiricist. 
But it is not that simple. We need to differentiate between empirical and empiricist, 
between rational and rationalistic. As we have seen, empiricism is a philosophical 
viewpoint, adopted by those we call empiricists, which states experience is the only firm 
foundation of knowledge. Rationalism is a contrasting philosophical viewpoint, adopted 
by those we call rationalists, which states logic is the only firm foundation of knowledge. 
By basing knowledge only in experience or logic, empiricism and rationalism are 
extreme views. Contrast that with the idea of empirical as "consistent with observation" 
and rational as "consistent with logic." 
Therefore, science in general, and psychology specifically, is not empiricist or 
rationalistic, but it is empirical and rational. It is empirical because it stresses the 
observation of sense experience and it is rational because it assumes a logical order exists 
in that experience. The extreme views of empiricism and rationalism cannot operate in 
this blend of empirical and rational. They don't lead to good science, so they don't lead to 
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good psychology either. Table 3 restates the empiricist and rationalist views of mind, 
learning and knowledge and adds their views of psychology's focus. 
Empiricism Rationalism 
View of Mind Passive mind Active mind 
Mind is a blank slate Mind has innate knowledge 
View of Involuntary association Voluntary act of will 
Learning 
Based on sense experience Based on logical thought 
View of Skeptical Dogmatic 
Possibility of 
Nothing is knowable Everything is knowable Knowledge 
View of Sensation* Perception! Reason 
Focus of 
Psychology Conscious Processes Non-conscious processes 
View conscious experience as the View conscious experience as 
association of simple elements continuous stream of wholes 
... ... Table 3: EmpIrICist and RatIOnalIst Views of the Mmd, Learnmg, the PossibilIty of Knowledge and 
Focus of Psychology. *Influences of empiricism on psychology adapted from Schultz and Schultz (1987, p. 
37). 
The story of psychology can be viewed as a constant struggle between empiricism 
and rationalism to pull psychology toward one of these extremes. In this next section we 
will briefly survey the evidences of this struggle. We will review the history of 
psychology under four basic headings, structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, and 
current cognitive theory. The following section will look to the ideas ofImmanuel Kant 
to synthesize these influences in psychology as we have already seen him synthesize 
these influences in psychology. 
Structuralism 
As described by influential psychologist E.B Titchener (1867-1927), structuralism 
focused on the "elemental sensations and images that, in his view, composed the structure 
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of consciousness" (Schultz & Schultz 1987, p. 90). In Titchener's view, psychology 
should study the sensations of shape and color people experience when they observe an 
apple, not why they describe those experiences as an apple (p. 89). Obviously Titchener's 
structuralism, focused on raw uninterpreted sense experience, is heavily influenced by 
empiricism. Titchener was a student of Wilhelm Wundt, founder of the first 
psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, an achievement which has led to his title 
of the father of psychology. Titchener claimed that he was bringing the ideas of Wundt to 
American soil. As an influential psychologist and sole translator of Wundt into English, 
this claim went unchallenged. However, more recent scholarship suggests that Titchener 
"altered Wundt's system dramatically while claiming to be a loyal follower" (p. 85). I 
would argue that structuralism, as developed by Wundt and other early German 
psychologists exhibited a balance of empirical and rational influence, not the radical 
empiricism one might see by reading Titchener alone. 
The work of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) exhibited a balance of empirical and 
rational views. The empirical influence is displayed by Wundt's insistence on the 
elements of experience. Wundt wrote, "the first step in the investigation of a fact must 
therefore be a description of the individual elements ... ofwhich it consists" (Diamond, 
1980, p. 85). Perhaps inspired by the thought of chemist Mendeleyev, Wundt hoped to 
develop a "periodic table of the mind" (Marx & Hillix, 1979, p. 67). However empirical 
his science, Wundt was no empiricist. He showed an appreciation of the wholeness of 
human thought when he wrote, "Every psychic compound has characteristics which are 
by no means the mere sum ofthe characteristics of the elements" (1896, p. 375). This 
wholeness or unity of experience, Wundt labeled "apperception", which is an "active 
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process ... The mind is not merely acted upon by the experienced elements; rather, it acts 
on them in the creative synthesis of the parts to make up the whole" (Schultz & Schultz, 
1987, p. 67). For example, "we see a tree as a unity, not the many and varied sensations 
of brightness, hue or shape" (p. 67). Wundt's apperception is at odds with British 
empiricism and the view that Wundt's student E.B. Titchener ascribed to Wundt and 
promoted so heavily in the United States. 
Other early German psychologists seemed to lean towards empiricism or 
rationalism, but when looked upon as a whole, this early German school exhibits a 
balance of these views. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) was markedly empiricist as he 
focused on how the association of simple elements leads to complex thought. Georg Elias 
Muller (1850-1934) exhibited rational influences as he rejected learning by association 
alone and included more active "mental phenomena, such as readiness, hesitation, and 
doubt... that actively influence learning ( emphasis mine)" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 
75). Carl Stumpf(1848-1936) believed Wundt's empirical focus on the elements of 
experience was wrong; he thought the reduction of experience to elements rendered it 
"artificial and abstract, no longer natural" (p. 78). Sturnpfs more rational appreciation of 
the wholeness of experience directly influenced Gestalt psychology. Oswald Kulpe 
(1862-1915) founded the Wurzburg school of thought in opposition to Wundt's empirical 
elementalism. The Wurzburg school suggested the idea of imageless thought, which is a 
direct blow to the sense-based knowledge of empiricism. Kulpe showed that mental states 
such as "hesitation, doubt, confidence, searching, or waiting for an answer" (p. 81) are 
not produced by a passive association of sense-based images. Importantly, Kulpe reacted 
against empiricist focus on consciousness to investigate non-conscious influences on 
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consciousness. Kulpe's work helped pave the way for Freud's psychological theory (p. 
82). 
In conclusion, the empiricist structuralism that Titchener brought to and disseminated 
in America, was not representative of the original more balanced structuralism of 
Germany. German scholarship displayed a balance of empirical and rational influences 
that served psychology well. "German thought was spared the eighty or ninety years of 
British experience [with empiricism] and passed directly from rationalism to Kant's 
reconstruction of philosophy" (Clark, 195712000, p. 309). Germany had an interest in all 
new science and the discipline to carry out the empirical and experimental work (Schultz 
& Schultz, 1987, p. 43) yet it remained open to more rational influences. These rational 
influences can be seen very early in German psychology and later developed into schools 
of thought, such as those of Freud or the Gestalt psychologists, which were distinct from 
the American schools. We will now trace the influence of empiricism and rationalism on 
the first distinctly American school of psychological thought, functionalism. 
Functionalism 
As its name suggests, functionalism was a school more concerned with the function 
rather than the structure of the mind. Functionalism would not be content with describing 
the elements of consciousness, a "periodic table of the mind." It focused on perception 
and purpose; it searched for the "ways and means of the mind." It was a psychological 
expression of evolutionary biology. Functional psychology "came to be more concerned 
with the adaptation of the organism to its environment" while structuralism's "detailed 
investigation of mental elements began to lose its appeal" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 
115). It was more philosophical and less experimental than the balanced German 
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structuralism. In fact, functional psychology's two main founders, William James and 
John Dewey, are perhaps more widely known as philosophers than psychologists. A brief 
description of these two philosopher/psychologists will provide an idea of the struggle 
between empiricism and rationalism in functionalism. In the end we will see 
functionalism was a school that blended empiricism and rationalism in a way that 
ultimately led to the development of an extreme form of psychological empiricism, 
behaviorism. 
William James was not a disciple of empiricism or rationalism. In Pragmatism 
(1907), James derides the "serpent of rationalism, or intellectualism" (p. 19). He viewed 
logic, not as an innate idea, but as the result of evolution. Logic does not exist objectively 
in the outside world as a rationalist would argue, or innately in the human mind as Kant 
would argue; logic exists through evolution because it was pragmatic (useful) to the 
species. He agreed with the empiricists that knowledge must come through experience, 
yet "not experience consisting of discrete, atomic simple ideas, but experience as an ever-
flowing stream of consciousness" (Clark, 2000, p. 389). We see in Berliner's (2001) 
description of James the rejection of empiricist and rationalist extremes for a more 
balanced approach: "He would have found nothing wrong with a scientific and strongly 
behavioral psychology ... but such a psychology would not provide a complete picture of 
humans" (p. 6). 
James' thought led to a more balanced view of functionalism, the study of the whole 
mind as it adapts to its environment. In James' thinking, the mind is not purely passive or 
active. Though James believed the environment conditions the mind to operate passively 
in "habit systems," he also "emphasized the human capacity to exercise initiative and to 
58 
introduce novelty into the evolutionary process" (Rippa, 1997, p. 181). If, as we have 
described above, Kant's view was of an interactive mind that constructed knowledge in 
an ongoing evolving process, we can see some similarity between Kant and James. Of 
course Kant believed the foundation of this process is the innate and objective structure 
of the human mind, while James viewed the mind as the product of evolution. It is 
important to note this issue raises critical ethical issues (Are our morals part of our innate, 
God-given essence, or are they just rules that have evolved and that we can change to 
further our species?), but those issues need not concern us here. What will concern us is 
that James' view of mind as the result of evolution reduces the mind to a physical 
phenomenon and opens the door for extreme empiricism, behaviorism 
John Dewey (1859-1952) was an "American giant" who formally founded the 
functionalist school of psychology. Like James, Dewey developed a functionalism wth 
both empiricist and rationalist views that ultimately paved the way for the extreme 
empiricism of behaviorism. Dewey was initially interested in rational philosophy (his 
doctoral thesis was on Kant, in fact) but it was James' Principles of Psychology that most 
deeply influenced Dewey (Rippa, 1997, p. 164). Like James, Dewey stood "against 
elementalism and in defense of a more holistic view" (Berliner, 2001, p. 11). Berliner 
(2001) sees in Dewey's functionalism the seeds of the contemporary cognitive approach: 
Dewey believed the "individual's internal processes must be understood" (p. 12) and 
"what held together stimuli and their responses were the interpretations given to both, 
thus putting consciousness, attribution, and constructivist views squarely before 
[historically speaking] the emerging stimulus-response (S-R) psychologists of that time" 
(p. 11). 
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Yet Dewey's psychology is not rationalist or mind centered. Dewey is "definite in his 
repudiation of both innate ideas and a blank mind" (Clark, 1957/2000, p. 401) as the 
foundation of psychology. He considers the "starting point, then, is the compound of men 
and things, and this compound may be called Experience" (p. 404). However, once 
Dewey compounded or fused men and things, mind and experience, knowledge and 
learning soon become purely physical. In Democracy and Education (1944), Dewey 
wrote that teachers should, "give pupils something to do, not something to learn; and the 
doing is of such a nature as to demand thinking, or the intentional noting of connection; 
learning naturally results" (quoted in Rippa, 1997, p. 171). We see in this prescription a 
leaning towards behaviorism. Let's contrast Kant's blend of empiricism and rationalism, 
which led to a more cognitive approach, with James' and Dewey's blend which led to a 
more behaviorist approach. 
Kant's synthesis of empiricism and rationalism led him to an interactive view; 
knowledge is a construction of mind and experience. Yet, ultimately it was more of a 
mind centered approach, because he viewed experience as a necessary component to 
discover how our mind is the objective basis of knowledge. Think back to the analogy of 
the jelly and the jar. The jar learns of its own innate and objective qualities through the 
experience of the jelly. For example, through experience in the material world we learn of 
our objective and innate ideas of space, time, language, etc. Any philosophy or 
psychology pursued from this perspective is bound to be more mind centered, more 
cognitive. Gestalt psychology, Freudian psychoanalysis, nativist theory, constructivism 
and schema theory can find their origins more directly in Kant. 
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On the other hand, pragmatism's blend of empiricism and rationalism led to a 
compound or fused view of mind and experience. Mind and experience are not two things 
interacting to form knowledge constructions; mind and experience are really one thing. 
There is no separate "jelly" or "jar," there is one thing "jellyandjar." However, once you 
fuse mind and experience, mind soon disappears. "Mind ... " in Dewey's view, "is the 
complex of bodily habits, and knowledge lives in the muscles" (Clark, 1957/2000, p. 
408). In James' 1904 article, "Does Consciousness Exist?" he concluded, "the stream of 
thinking ... consists chiefly of the stream of breathing" (p. 403). Functionalism may have 
exhibited some rational and cognitive characteristics, "beliefs the nascent behaviorists 
chose ultimately to ignore" (Berliner, 2001, p. 6), but it also exhibited some extreme 
empiricist traits. It was men like E.L. Thorndike who picked up on functional 
psychology's empiricist traits and developed a behaviorist approach that dominated 
American psychology for decades. 
Behaviorism 
E. L. Thorndike (1874-1949) was a student of James' at Harvard, yet he was no 
disciple: "Thorndike's version of science and his vision of educational psychology has 
led us to a narrower conception of our field than would have been true had the views of 
these three other ancestors [James, Dewey and G.S. Hall] gained prominence" (Berliner, 
2001, p. 5). James and Dewey developed a more balanced approach, but it was the radical 
empiricist views of Thorndike that "promoted and directed our field [educational 
psychology] for half a century" (p. 16). James' and Dewey's functional psychology 
explained the mind in Darwinian evolutionary terms. Since Darwin had blurred, if not 
erased, the line between man and animal, animal psychology as developed by Thorndike 
61 
gained acceptance. Through his study of animal behavior Thorndike developed his ideas 
of "connectionism, an experimental approach to associationism" (Schultz & Schultz, 
1987, p. 181). This is an associationism that could make even the British empiricists 
blush: "Instead of talking about associations or connections between ideas, Thorndike 
talked about connections between situations and responses" (p. 182). Thorndike's 
connectionism led to a decreased role of the mind and directly to an extreme from of 
empiricism, behaviorism. 
Behaviorism is the modern voice of empiricism (DiVesta, 1987; Kratochwill & Bijou, 
1987; Reynolds et aI., 1996). Behaviorism has been described as a revolution against both 
structuralism and functionalism: "It was truly a revolt, an open break, a total war ... 
sudden, traumatic, and dramatic, no modification of the past, no compromise, but a 
complete change" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 173). However, as we have noted, 
functionalism's view of the mind as the result of evolution opened the door for the view 
that mind is purely a physical entity and then the behaviorist view that mind does not 
exist. Behaviorism's founder, J.B. Watson (1878-1958) "rejected the classic distinction 
between mind and body" (Rippa, 1997, p. 198) and was left with only body. From his 
behaviorist perspective, "there is no room for any organizing or framing function of the 
mind in this approach; indeed, there is no room for a mentalistic concept such as 'mind'" 
(Reynolds et aI., 1996, p. 95). Watson's directive for psychologists was to "start work on 
psychology, making behavior, not consciousness the objective point of our attack" 
(Watson, 1913). Others took up his directive, notably B.F. Skinner, who most 
influentially applied the behaviorist school of thought in his system of operant 
conditioning. 
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Current Cognitive Theories 
For the first half of the 20th century, behaviorism held American educational 
psychology in a "strangle hold" that was "successfully challenged" by cognitive 
psychology (Mayer, 1996, p. 153). Some examples of these challengers are information 
processing theory, schema theory, and constructivism. Each of these cognitive 
perspectives is by default more rational or mind centered than the radically empiricist and 
experience centered behaviorist view. Yet each one still leans towards rationalism or 
empiricism. 
The rational influence in current cognitive theory is seen most clearly in schema 
theory and individual constructivism. Schema theory contributes to our understanding of 
cognition by describing the role of background knowledge in the process of knowledge 
construction (Nuthall, 1999). Thus schema theory leans more toward a "top-down" or 
rational approach. Reynolds et al. (1996) identify schema theory as the only current 
cognitive theory that leans more toward a mind centered approach. Constructivism, more 
a principle than a theory of learning, argues that understanding is constructed rather than 
recorded (Phillips, 2000). Piaget (1952, 1959, 1970), who stressed the development of 
individual's knowledge construction, came from a distinctly mind centered or rational 
approach. Schultz and Schultz (1987) explain, "Gestalt psychologists as well as Piaget 
argued that the tendency to organize conscious experience (sensations and perceptions) 
into meaningful wholes is innate. Thus the mind gives form and coherence to mental 
experience" (p. 375). 
The empirical influence in current cognitive theory is seen most clearly in 
information processing theory and social constructivist perspectives. The information 
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processing metaphor "enabled the rebirth of cognitive psychology by providing an 
alternative to the behaviorist view oflearning" (Mayer, 1996, p. 157). Information 
processing contributes to our understanding of cognition by describing our cognitive 
architecture, metacognitive abilities and, as elaborated by cognitive load theory (Sweller, 
van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998), the limitations of working memory. Yet, despite its use 
of cognitive terms, information processing still is recognized by its empiricist leanings. It 
may have substituted a computer metaphor for the switchboard metaphor of behaviorism 
(Reynolds et aI., 1996), yet information processing still shows cognition as progressing in 
a "bottom-up" manner in which discrete stimuli are processed into more complex forms 
of knowledge, one of the defining traits of empiricism. Vygotsky (1978,1986) developed 
a more socially oriented constructivist perspective, stressing the role of culture, social 
interaction, and language in learning (Fowler, 1994; Rogoff, 1990). His social 
constructivist perspective would lean more toward the experience centered perspective 
than Piaget's individual constructivist perspective (Reynolds et aI., 1996). 
In summary, current cognitive theory needs to unify and clarify its empirical and 
rational influences. We have seen how in the history of philosophy, cognitive theory has 
exemplified the struggle between empiricism and rationalism, between experience-
centered and mind-centered approaches We have seen how this struggle continued in the 
early history of psychology as structuralism and functionalism tried to define and 
maintain a balance. In Europe this balance ultimately titled toward a more rational 
approach, yet, "Historically, American psychology has had a decidedly experience-
oriented, mechanistic attitude ... [which] was likely first established by the British 
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Empricists. The cognitive revolution did not really change this attitude" (Reynolds et aI., 
1996, p. 102). 
As described earlier, current cognitive theory is in need of a more balanced and 
unified approach. The thought of Immanuel Kant can help provide such a unified theory. 
In an attempt to unify philosophy, Immanuel Kant developed his ideas of the interactive 
mind that constructed knowledge in an evolving manner. The next chapter will show how 
Kant's ideas can lead to a theory of cognition which unifies the more empirical 
information processing theory with the more rational schema theory in light of the 
constructivist framework that underlies them both. 
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Chapter IV: Results 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), recognized as one of the world's great philosophers 
(Ozmon & Craver, 2003), was born, lived, and died all in the seaside town of 
Konigsburg, Prussia. To any observer, his life was entirely unremarkable. His social 
status was decidedly middle class; his religion was strictly Lutheran; his education was 
typically rigorous. AU this prepared him to take a position on the faculty at the local 
university where he lectured in mathematics, physics, geography (astounding in that he 
never left his own town) and, of course, philosophy. 
Kant devoted himself to philosophy rather late in life, being appointed professor 
of metaphysics and logic when he was 46, and arguably founding modem philosophy and 
psychology when he was 57, when he published his Critique of Pure Reason. It is 
unnecessary to describe every detail of Kant's philosophy in this paper, if it is even 
possible, for, "It is not clear that every aspect of his thought has been intelligible to 
anyone, even to Kant" (Scruton, 2001, i). 
However Kant's ideas of what schemata are and how they are formed can help 
extend the limitations of cognitive learning theory. Let us join what linguist Umberto Eco 
(1997) calls, "the return to Kant discernible in many contemporary cognitive sciences" 
(p. 89) and see how Kant can help unify cognitive learning theory. To proceed, we will 
see how Kant can help answer the difficult questions posed above to constructivism, 
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schema theory, and information processing theory. Let's first consider Kant's system 
from the perspective of knowledge construction. 
Kant and Constructivism 
• What exactly is constructivism? 
Suppose two students are briefly shown the sentence, "The cowboy rode tall tall 
in the saddle." Suppose that after the sentence was removed from the students' vision, the 
students were instructed, "Remember what you saw and describe it." It is likely that one 
student might recall it exactly as written including "tall tall," while another student might 
recall it as, "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle." Both are certain they are right. How 
could this happen? 
Any theory that says knowledge is recorded in the mind, could not explain how 
this could happen. A recording must be an exact reproduction. A photocopy of "The 
cowboy rode tall tall in the saddle" will not read, "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle." 
An audio recording of "The cowboy rode tall tall in the saddle" will not playback, "The 
cowboy rode tall in the saddle." Yet many philosophers and psychologists have suggested 
knowledge is indeed recorded by the mind. This is the view of learning supported by 
empirical philosophers such as Berkeley, Locke and Hume, and behaviorist 
psychologists. They say the mind is like a passive lump of clay while sense experience is 
like an active hand. Like a thumb leaves a thumbprint on a piece of clay, sense 
experience impresses itself on the mind. The thumbprint cannot change; the imprint of 
the sense experience cannot change. Yet the student's memory of "The cowboy rode tall 
tall in the saddle" changed to "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle." That is why the idea 
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of recorded knowledge cannot explain these kinds of changes. Our perceptions and 
thoughts are too different, too unique, to be the result of mere recording. 
Then is it more accurate to say that we individually create knowledge? Do we 
authoritatively decide what we will think? A theory that suggests that knowledge is 
created would see the mind like the active hand, not the passive piece of clay. This view 
oflearning has also been supported philosophers and psychologists. To use a broad 
brush, this is the view of learning supported by rational philosophers such as Leibniz and 
Spinoza and radical constructivists. They suggest the mind is so active that it actually 
creates knowledge, as ifby magic. It snaps it fingers and a 747 jet appears; it crosses it 
fingers and knows what love is; it wiggles its fingers and remembers, "The cowboy rode 
tall tall in the saddle" or "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle." It doesn't matter what 
knowledge the mind creates, as long as it is useful to or approved by its creator. This may 
be an interesting self-help philosophy, but it is not a description oflearning that can help 
teachers. The student who restated the sentence "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle" only 
changed one word, he did not say, "The rain in Spain falls mainly on the plain." He did 
not leap from his seat and start doing jumping jacks. It may be possible for one person to 
point to an object and say, "book" and for another to say, "dictionary," but it is unlikely 
that someone will say "polka-dotted democracy." People do not create knowledge. Our 
perceptions and thoughts have too much in common to be the result of creation. 
There must be a middle way between these two extremes. Educational psychology 
is searching for this middle way between these extremes of behaviorism and radical 
constructivism. Almost two hundred years ago, the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant 
searched for a middle way between the similar extremes of empirical and rational 
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philosophy. The middle way he described essentially founded modem philosophy and 
psychology. Kant was the first to describe the active mind in a way that contemporary 
cognitive psychology can identify. Kant suggested that knowledge is, not recorded or 
created, but constructed. 
Kant saw the mind as both the hand and the piece of clay. Let the hand represent 
the structure and function of the human mind. A hand has a normal structure of five 
fingers and one thumb; a hand has normal functions of fingers grasping, poking, pushing 
while the thumb can move in opposition to the fingers. Kant considered that the mind 
has normal structures (imagination, for example) and functions (inference, for example) 
too. Consider that the piece of clay represents all sense perceptions, all experiences. The 
clay is not reality, but our perception of it. Here is how it works: we see a 747 airplane 
and the hand shapes the clay into a representation of the airplane. The plane did not strike 
our minds and leave an exact impression or recording. The hand did not create a plane 
out of thin air. The hand has constructed a representation of the plane from the clay. 
Beers (1987) explains that to see knowledge as constructed is to see knowledge as 
individually designed using common raw materials. 
To illustrate, imagine we give two people two identical stacks of building materials 
and ask them to build a doghouse. The resulting constructions may be very unique, one 
may have a window, one may have a raised floor, etc. However, the doghouses will have 
just as much in common since they will be made of identical materials and (hopefully for 
the dog's sake) exist in compliance with the laws of physics. Knowledge is constructed in 
much the same way. It is not merely recorded or processed; it is too unique for that. Yet 
our knowledge has too much in common to be pure creation. 
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It is remarkable to think that Kant described knowledge construction in this way 
almost two hundred years before the "cognitive revolution." This Kantian analysis is 
consistent with the principles of constructivism mentioned previously: 
1) knowledge is constructed, not merely recorded or processed, by individuals, 
(Phillips, 2000); 
2) knowledge construction is affected by the experiences and development of the 
learner (Piaget,1952, 1959, 1970); 
3) knowledge construction occurs in a social context (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). 
Now we will see what Kant can bring to schema theory. If Kant can be described as a 
founder of constructivism, he can certainly be described as a founder of schema theory 
since "schema" is a term he actually coined. 
Kant and Schema Theory 
• What exactly is a schema? 
Linguist Umberto Eco (1997) states, schematism "suffers from insufficient 
historical background" (p. 7). A reading of educational psychology texts supports this 
view. This is a typical description: "The historical roots of the concept of schema in 
psychology can be traced to Bartlett's (1932) classic book on prose memory, 
Remembering, as well as Piaget's (1954) classic discussion of intellectual development" 
(Mayer, 1987, p. 329). This is true in a technical sense; however, the concept of schema 
was birthed in philosophy by Immanuel Kant, more than 150 before Bartlett's "classic 
book". In its first definition, the Oxford English Dictionary recognizes Kant's primacy in 
developing the term "schema": 
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1. In Kant: Anyone of certain fonns or rules of the 'productive imagination' 
through which the understanding is able to apply its 'categories' to the manifold 
of sense-perception in the process of realizing knowledge or experience. 
In more direct language, a schema is a rule the imagination follows to construct 
images. Consider this in tenns of the analogy of the hand and the lump of clay. The hand 
represents the imagination; the lump of clay represents an image. How hand shapes the 
clay, the rule that it follows in shaping the clay, is the schema. Think of all the ways we 
use images. We construct images when we use our eyes to perceive, when we imagine 
something we have never seen, or when we remember something we have seen. 
Schemata are the rules we follow when we construct these images. Let's consider 
schemata as the rules we follow as we construct the images we perceive, imagine or 
remember. 
Schemata are rules that guide visual perception. Think again about the two 
students confronted with the sentence, "The cowboy rode tall tall in the saddle." The first 
student perceived it exactly as written. From this student alone, we could not detennine if 
this perception was the result of passive recording or active construction. But when the 
second student actually perceived, "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle," it proved his 
perception was constructed, not recorded. But we don't only construct our 
misperceptions; we construct all our perceptions. 
All our perceptions are composites of what is really there and what we expect to 
be there. Think about it - why did the student perceive the sentence with only one "tall?" 
He perceived it with one "tall" because he expected it to have only one "tall." His 
expectation guided the construction of the image. His expectation was the rule he 
followed. The schema was part of the rule that specifically guided his construction of the 
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image. When confronted with the sentence, his schema followed the rule about not 
doubling words and guided him to construct the perception, "The cowboy rode tall in the 
saddle." The first student had a similar schema, but his imagination did not follow it. In 
fact he may have noticed and remembered the sentence precisely because it did not 
follow the schema. Schemata are not determinative laws, they are rules or guidelines we 
sometimes follow and sometimes do not. 
In much the same way, schemata guide the images we imagine. Like a perceived 
image, an imagined image is constructed. Beers (1987) explains how constructed 
knowledge is individually designed using common raw materials. How are we able to 
imagine a pink polar bear? How are we able to imagine a flexible triangle that can 
assume any possible combination of angles and side-lengths? We can imagine these 
things because our mind can combine the schema for "pink" and for "polar bear" to 
construct an image of a pink polar bear. Our mind can combine our schema for "flexible" 
and "triangle" and construct an image of a flexible triangle. Pink polar bears and flexible 
triangles do not exist; they could not have been passively recorded in our minds. 
A supporter of the passive mind might say, "Well the mind has previously 
recorded images of "pink" and of "polar bear," and the mind combines these recordings 
to construct the imagination." The inconsistency is clear - combining recorded 
knowledge and constructing images are activities. At some point the supporter of the 
passive mind must tum to the active mind to explain human thought. But Kant shows us 
how our imagined images of "pink polar bears" are constructions based on perceived 
images of "polar bears" and "pink" which were also constructions. Images, whether 
imagined or perceived, are constructed. This view is consistent and adequate in a way a 
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passive view cannot be. Schemata are rules that guide the construction of perceived and 
imagined images, but do schemata also guide the construction of images that are 
remembered? 
If our perceptions are constructed, then our remembrance of our perceptions is a 
reconstruction. Therefore our constructed perceptions can be different than reality and 
our reconstructed memories can be different than our perceptions. In the words of Loftus 
and Loftus (1980): "Not only might the original acquired memory have departed from 
reality in some systematic way, but the memory may have been continually subject to 
change after it was initially stored" (p. 419). These memories, these reconstructed 
images, are also guided by schemata. 
If two people witness the same traffic accident, or if two siblings experience the 
same childhood event, they may later visualize different images. This vivid visual 
memory is not a recording, but it is a reconstruction. The memories are similar because 
they are reconstructed from a common experience. Yet they are unique because the 
schemata, the rules that guided the imagination in its reconstruction, are unique. Why do 
we sometimes alter our memories? Remember that Loftus (1993) describes how people 
can remember voting when they had not and suggests: "One interpretation of these 
findings is that people fill in gaps in their memory with socially desirable constructions, 
thus creating for themselves a false memory of voting" (p. 532). People have a self-
concept that includes civic responsibility. In this case we see the self-concept guiding the 
schema. The self-concept is serving as a rule that guides the schema as it guides the 
construction of images. Fascinatingly, this is exactly how Kant described the relationship 
between concepts and schemata. Kant saw the schema as a part of a concept. The concept 
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is the broader rule to construct meaning while the schema is the part of the concept that 
specifically constructs images. 
• How are schemata related to concepts? 
Like a schema, a concept can be described as an expectation or rule. The Kantian 
concept can be identified with understanding, which Kant described as the "faculty of 
concepts" or the "faculty of rules" (Kitcher, 1990, p. 200). A concept is simply broader 
than a schema. A concept is a rule for constructing understanding; a schema is "the part 
of the concept that permits perceptual recognition ... or the rule for constructing images 
of concept instances" (p. 196). Schemata are related specifically to images while concepts 
are related to more general understanding. Kant defined the concept as "a rule that allows 
you to unite separately given perceptual materials together under one label" (p. 195). 
Take the concept "dog," for example. We have united all our separate experiences 
of dogs, all the dogs we have seen, read and heard about, under the label "dog." The 
concept "dog" contains all our knowledge and our feelings about dogs. The part of the 
concept that is image-based (what dogs generally look like, what particular species look 
like, or what a childhood pet looked like, etc.) is the schema. The schema for the concept 
dog guides our construction of images of dogs, the images of dogs we perceive, imagine 
or remember. The rest ofthe concept "dog" is language-based (that dogs are mammals, 
that dogs hear better than we do, that dogs pant when they are hot, etc.). We have 
discussed how schemata guide the construction of images which are perceived, imagined 
or visually remembered, following this line of thought we can see how concepts guide the 
construction of understanding that is recognized, possible, or generally remembered. 
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Concepts are rules that guide recognition. Just as we saw schemata at work when 
the student made a mistake in perception, we can see concepts at work when someone 
makes a mistake in recognition. Umberto Eco (1997) relays the amusing story about 
explorer Marco Polo's first encounter with a rhinoceros. Polo "recognized" a unicorn. He 
had never before seen a rhinoceros nor a unicorn, but he did possess the concept of 
unicorn from reading Greek mythology. He had constructed a rule for unicorn, something 
about a fantastical white horse with a single horn on its muzzle. When he received the 
sense stimulus of seeing the rhinoceros, his understanding followed his rule for unicorn. 
He "recognized" a unicorn (p. 57-58). 
Again, like with perception, just because we can easily see the use of rules when 
we make mistakes, does not mean we use them only when we make mistakes. Any time 
we recognize or name something, we are using our rules to construct meaning. If two 
people who have never formed a rule for platypus suddenly encounter one, one is likely 
to name it "bird" while another is likely to name it "mammal." It depends on what 
concepts and schema are followed. The same process happens when we hear or read 
about something. If someone describes to us the political system of ancient Athens, we 
are likely to recognize it correctly as "democracy," or more accurately as a "pure 
democracy," or mistakenly as a "republic." It all depends on what rules we have formed 
in the past and how we apply them in the present. Whether it is an image we perceive and 
recognize as unicorn, or a government we read about and recognize as a democracy, we 
are applying rules to construct meaning. 
Just as we use schema to construct images we imagine, we use concepts to 
conceive possibilities. We can imagine a pink polar bear, because we have formed 
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schemas for "pink" and "polar bear." We can conceive of a despotic democracy because 
we have formed concepts for "despotic" and "democracy." We cannot conceive of or 
form an image of a "dinkled diam," because we have not formed rules for "dinkled" or 
"diam" (which are of course invented words). Interestingly we can see that they were 
invented using rules of how vowels and consonants are combined to make English words. 
We can conceive of them as possible English words because they follow these rules. Our 
existing concepts guide, even determine, our possible new concepts. This is a powerful 
statement about the importance of discovering and activating students' background 
knowledge. Students can only perceive and understand new knowledge through the lens 
of background knowledge. Concepts do guide the construction of possibilities, but do 
concepts also guide the construction of memories, of meaning that is remembered? 
Concepts do guide remembered meaning, or meaning that is reconstructed. 
Consider again our two students confronted with "The cowboy rode tall tall in the 
saddle." As discussed earlier it is likely that one student actually perceived, "The cowboy 
rode tall in the saddle" because his concepts and schemata about English guided his 
perception. I actually made this very misperception in an educational psychology class. 
However, is it possible that a student would perceive it as written, but when later asked to 
remember it, would then alter the sentence to contain only one "tall?" In other words, is 
perception and meaning frozen in memory or is it subject to change? 
Common experience and controlled experiments tell us that our memories do 
indeed change over time. I recently told a professor about an article on how Kant 
influenced Maslow's [sic] hierarchy of ethical reasoning. My professor suggested that I 
must have actually been referring to Kohlberg's hierarchy. I deliberately paused to check 
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my memory of the article. I actually visualized the page with the reference, and clearly 
saw Maslow's name in the upper left hand of the page. My professor was shocked to 
think such a mistake actually made it to print. When I actually checked the article, I 
found the mistake was mine. When I looked at the page in question, there was Kohlberg's 
name in the lower right hand of the page. We were amazed to see how my self-concept 
had guided my imagination to create a false visual memory. My embarrassment at 
making this mistake unconsciously guided me to create a false visual memory. 
This is the same phenomenon experienced by people who create a false memory 
of voting described by Loftus (1993). These people's self-concept includes being a 
responsible voting citizen; this self-concept leads them to create a false memory of 
voting. Our concepts do not just guide our reconstruction of images, but of meaning in 
general. Remember the experiment conducted by Conway & Ross (1984) in which 
students who were given instruction in study skills were asked to remember their initial 
study skills and the subsequent improvement in their grades. The students exaggerated 
the weakness of their initial study skills and the improvement in their grades, even though 
there was no real change. They had formed a concept of an expectation of change that 
guided their reconstruction of meaning. 
Consider again our two students who see, "The cowboy rode tall tall in the 
saddle." It is very possible that the student would initially perceive it with two "talls," but 
later reconstruct the image with only one "tall," from fear of remembering something that 
"couldn't be right." We have seen how concepts guide the construction of meaning that is 
recognized, possible, or remembered, and how a schema is the part of the concept that 
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guides the construction of images. Now we will discuss the benefits of describing 
concepts and schemas specifically as rules. 
• Are concepts and schemata rules or prototypes? 
Two contemporary theories of concept learning are rule-based theories and 
prototype theories (Eggen & Kauchak, 2001). Obviously, a Kantian theory of concepts is 
a rule-based theory. However, a Kantian theory of concepts is a rule-based theory that 
encompasses the image-based orientation of prototype or exemplar theories. That is 
because a Kantian concept encompasses the image-based schema. A Kantian concept is 
constructed from both visual and non-visual experience, so it is a combination of rules 
and prototypes. Consider again our triangle. Whether we are seeing examples of 
triangles, hearing triangles described in language, or seeing triangles described with 
language (reading) we are still constructing rules from sense experience. Our rules, our 
concepts and the schemas associated with them, are our construction of meaning. 
It is beneficial to think of concepts and schemas as rules rather than as definitions 
or laws. A rule can be continually modified while a definition or law has the air of fixed 
objectivity. The words "definition" or "law" give the sense of something unchanging that 
we discover, like the law of gravity. But Kant uses the word "rule" in the sense of 
"guideline, principle, rule of thumb," not in the sense of "definition" or "law." Kitcher 
(1990) quotes Kant: "Since the synthesis of empirical concepts is not arbitrary but 
empirical and as such can never be complete (for in experience ever new characteristics 
of the concept can be discovered), empirical concepts cannot be defined" (p. 197). So for 
Kant our concepts are rules continually available for revision. 
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Thinking of concepts as rules that can be followed or revised can help us to 
describe Piaget's ideas of assimilation and accommodation. When we follow our rules, 
we are assimilating new sense experience. When we revise our rules, we are 
accommodating new sense experience. Consider again Marco Polo's experience with the 
rhinoceros. When he saw the rhinoceros, his concept "unicorn" assimilated this new 
sense experience. He followed his rule for "unicorn;" his concept and schema for 
"unicorn" guided what he perceived and recognized. Ifhe had a concept "elephant," he 
might have assimilated the rhinoceros into that just as easily. After all, they are both big 
and gray with a protuberance on their snout. 
However, interestingly, he also had to accommodate his concept "unicorn" in 
light ofthis new experience. He wrote in his journal, that a unicorn is "quite the contrary 
to that which we believe that it was" (Eco, 1997, p. 58). He revised his rule for unicorn. 
Polo revised his rule for unicorn by changing descriptors such as "white and beautiful" to 
"black and ugly." One wonders, why did Polo revise his rule for unicorn like this rather 
than revise his rule for animal by admitting a new species? Is this evidence of a hierarchy 
of concepts? Do we hold to some concepts more tightly than others? The rule for animal 
is more general than the rule for unicorn. Is that why Polo did not want to change it? 
Would it have caused too much overall change to his belief system? Would it have 
caused a greater amount of disequilibration? 
We see how thinking of concepts as rules can avoid Derry's (1992) criticism of 
focusing "exclusively on the construction of symbolic knowledge by individuals" (p. 
416) while neglecting "the world of work and every activity that occurs outside 
classrooms" (p. 414). As we have seen, our concepts can be rules about symbolic 
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knowledge, or rules about self-concept, or rules about social relationships. To describe 
learning as the construction of concepts, and to describe concepts as rules constructed 
from experience, is to describe learning in and out of the classroom. While we can 
distinguish cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains for the sake of discussion, 
there is no real division. 
When the teacher smiles and hands the student a sheet of math problems, every 
response, what the student thinks, what the student does, what the student feels, is the 
result of applying his rules to experience. We see that the goal of education is to help 
students construct rules that are as accurate and helpful as possible. If we can find a good 
way to linguistically represent these rules, then teachers can have a good way to state 
lesson objectives and structure learning experiences. 
• How can we linguistically describe concepts and schemata? 
Can we linguistically describe these concepts and schemata? Rumelhart and 
Ortony (1977) tell us, "schemata are not linguistic entities but abstract symbolic 
representations of knowledge which we express and describe in language" (p. 111). If so, 
then how can we linguistically represent such complex rules? We can linguistically 
represent a concept in the form of an "if ... then" statement: 
• "If a polygon has 3 sides, then it is a triangle." 
• "If a government forms its laws based on a majority vote of its populace, then it is 
a democracy." 
• "If the top number in the ones column of a subtraction number is smaller than the 
lower number, then you must 'borrow' from the tens column." 
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Anyone example of a concept expressed as an "if. .. then" statement may seem 
counterfeit, simplistic, and yet cumbersome. It is. That is because we are using language 
to express it. If concepts are not linguistic entities, but rules that can be expressed in 
language, then expressing them in language will make them into something they are not, 
it will counterfeit them. Using language to express concepts always simplifies, isolates, 
limits and counterfeits human thought, yet it must be done for the sake of 
communication. 
An "if ... then" statement can be named a hypothetical inference. A hypothetical 
inference is our best guess at meaning using the clues we have. This is exactly what we 
do when we form and apply our concepts and schemata. The student who mistakenly 
perceived "The cowboy rode tall in the saddle," Marco Polo who mistakenly recognized a 
unicorn, the students who mistakenly remembered an improvement in their grades after 
instruction in study skills - all these people made their best guesses at meaning. These 
particular guesses were just not as accurate as most. Usually our guesses, our 
hypothetical inferences, are pretty accurate and helpful to us. 
To consider the hypothetical inference as the foundation of all human cognition is 
a line of thought developed by the American philosopher Charles Peirce (1839-1914). 
Peirce was a prominent developer of semiotics, the study of how humans infer from signs 
and symbols. Eco (1997) describes Peirce's position that human thought and even 
perception is based on inference. He writes about Peirce's conception of inference: 
Like the post-Kantian he was on his way to becoming, Peirce was later to say that 
this process of conceptualization proceeds only by hypothetical inferences 
therefore: it happens not only in the process of conceptualization but even in the 
recognition of sensations. (p. 61) 
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Say that we point to an object and label it "pretty yellow cup." Peirce would say 
we infer, we guess, that it is a "cup" not a "glass" or "mug," just as we guess that it is 
"yellow" not "cream" or "lemon," just as we guess it is "pretty," not "beautiful" or 
"elegant." Peirce views our thoughts and sense perceptions as sequential guesses of 
meaning in a symbolic environment; they are hypothetical inferences. 
Eco (1997) describes Peirce as "post-Kantian" (p. 61), because Kant did not 
consider concepts as formed by inference, but Peirce did. For Kant, inference was an 
ability of the faculty of reason, not of the faculty of understanding (which was the faculty 
of concepts or rules). For Kant, inference was conscious reasoning such as when we infer 
"Socrates is mortal," from the premises, "Socrates is a man" and, "All men are mortal." 
But Peirce helps us to see that inference is much more automatic and foundational. If we 
perceive a rather unattractive old man questioning young men in the streets of Athens, we 
infer that it is Socrates. If we hear the word "men" in this context we infer that it refers to 
mankind, not just male humans. 
At this point we must agree with Kitcher (1990) who stated, "We cannot turn to 
Kant and expect to discover that the true theory of concepts has been lying undetected in 
our midst for almost two hundred years" (p. 198). However to adopt the view that 
concepts are the products of this kind of automatic and foundational inference does not 
refute or significantly alter his theory of concepts, but his view of inference. 
Summary of Kant and Constructivism and Schema Theory 
A Kantian analysis of cognition tells us that we can describe knowledge as rules 
and express those rules in the form of"if...then" statements. This analysis has clarified 
and unified constructivism and schema theory. It has helped to clarify and under gird 
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constructivism as a set of principles rather than a distinct learning theory. A Kantian 
analysis of cognition is consistent with the constructivist principles: 
1) knowledge is constructed, not merely recorded or processed, by individuals, 
(Phillips, 2000); 
2) knowledge construction is affected by the experiences and development of the 
learner (Piaget,1952, 1959, 1970); 
3) knowledge construction occurs in a social context (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). 
A Kantian analysis of cognition has also alleviated the definitional vagueness of 
schema theory. Schemata and concepts can be described as rules rather than by 
comparison to scripts, plans, frameworks, slots, etc. Because of this, a Kantian analysis 
gives teachers a clearer description of the product of learning. Teachers can view their 
goal, not as the somewhat vague construction of knowledge or poorly defined schemata, 
but as the construction of rules. Furthermore, we have described those rules as "if ... then" 
statements, which gives teachers a functional way to consider objectives and structure 
learning experiences. This benefit will be fully explored in Chapter 5, titled "Discussion." 
Finally, because we see that concepts and schemas are rules that are constructed from 
experience, a Kantian analysis has helped to unify constructivism and schema theory. 
What remains is to examine how the construction of these rules is related to our cognitive 
architecture as described by information processing theory. 
Kant and Information Processing Theory 
To understand how the ideas of Kant can extend the limitations of information 
processing theory, it is important to understand a Kantian view of cognitive structure or 
architecture. Kant advocated a "two-tiered theory of belief' aptly described by Kitcher 
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(1990). Kant described two separate cognitive faculties, "understanding" and "reason. " 
The understanding forms concepts like "Socrates, mortal, man" and reason infers, "If 
Socrates is a man, and if all men are mortal, then Socrates is a mortal." The faculty of 
understanding forms concepts while the faculty of reason infers knowledge from 
concepts supplied by the understanding. We have already noted how Charles Peirce 
showed that inference is at the heart of all mental operations, so we need not correct Kant 
again on this point. With regards to information processing theory, the important thing is 
that Kant viewed understanding as unconscious and reason as conscious. 
If we take Kant's two faculties of unconscious understanding and conscious 
reason and superimpose them on information processing, what would be the result? 
Working memory (WM) can be identified with Kant's faculty of reason and long-term 
memory (L TM) can be identified with Kant's faculty of understanding. If "working 
memory can be equated with consciousness" (Sweller et aI., 1998, p. 252) and if WM is 
limited as described by cognitive load theory (Sweller et aI., 1998) then we can identify 
WM with Kant's faculty of reason. 
Kant viewed the faculty reason as "conscious and under (some) direct control" 
(Kitcher, 1990, p. 201) and as beset with the same limitations as WM. Kant described 
reason's purpose is "to reduce the varied and manifold knowledge obtained in the 
understanding to the smallest number of principles ... and thereby achieve the highest 
possible unity of knowledge" (p. 201). This is very consistent with the limits of WM as 
described by cognitive load theory. IfWM is consciousness then LTM is the unconscious 
and can be identified with Kant's faculty of understanding. Kant viewed the 
understanding, the forming of concepts/schemas, as "virtually unconscious and under no 
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voluntary control" (p. 200). The important difference is that L TM is typically considered 
passive, while Kant's faculty of concepts is extremely active. Kant's view of the active 
unconscious will help extend the limitations of information processing and unify it with 
constructivism and schema theory. 
The role of the unconscious is an important current topic in cognitive psychology, 
with many experts investigating the question, "Is the unconscious smart or dumb?" 
(Loftus & Klinger, 1992). Even Jerome Bruner (1992), who is reluctant to assign a major 
role to the unconscious, which he describes as "not very" smart, states, "it now seems 
downright barmy to assume that everything that affects any mental process, perceptual or 
otherwise, has to be accessible to consciousness" (p. 782). On the other hand, advocates 
of a smart unconscious have stated, "Although it might appear to some to be somewhat 
surprising, the ability of the human cognitive system to non-consciously acquire 
information is a general metatheoretical assumption of almost all of contemporary 
cognitive psychology" (Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1992, p. 796). This statement is 
supported by the very first paragraph of John Dewey's, "My Pedagogic Creed", first 
published in 1897: 
I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the 
social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at 
birth, and is continually shaping the individual's powers, saturating his 
consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings and 
emotions. Through this unconscious education the individual gradually comes to 
share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in 
getting together. He becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization. The 
most formal and technical education cannot safely depart from this general 
process. It can only organize it or differentiate it in some particular direction. (p. 
77) 
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Let's see how Kant's idea of the active unconscious can better define this 
"general process," and how it can help extend the limitations of information processing 
and unify it with constructivism and schema theory. 
• How are memories unconsciously elaborated in L TM? 
The passive L TM of information processing cannot explain how memories are 
elaborated unconsciously. Information processing theory describes L TM as a storehouse, 
like a bookshelf on which passive schemata rest. Schemata have been described passively 
as, "stereotypes, prototypes, templates, scripts, plans, and grammars" or "as 
'frameworks' with 'slots' to be filled, or 'packets' of knowledge contained within larger 
'packets' of knowledge" (Sadoski et aI., 1991, p.466). But Kant considers schemata as 
rules, as the ways our mind actively relates to sense experience. If this is accurate, then 
the place where they are stored, the L TM, is active as well. This active L TM can explain 
the unconscious elaboration of memories. 
We have thoroughly discussed how concepts and schemas guide the 
reconstruction of memories. We are "revisionist historians" (Johnson & Sherman, 1990, 
p. 497) and our concepts and schemata are the rules that guide how we edit and create 
memories. A person's self-concept may guide them to create a false memory of voting, or 
mistakenly visualize a page in a book with an error it did not contain. A person's 
expectations may cause them to remember a sentence with only one "tall" when it had 
two or to exaggerate academic improvement after instruction in study skills. A Kantian 
analysis of concepts and schemata has adequately explained all these elaborations of 
memories. Now we can see that these elaborations happened unconsciously in LTM, the 
place where concepts and schemata are formed. 
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In each case the memory had been stored in L TM. There were several minutes 
or even days between the experience and the memory of the experience. Yet when the 
memory was recollected it had been elaborated. None of these elaborations were lies; no 
person consciously constructed a false memory. These elaborations were made 
unconsciously, outside the person's awareness. This is evidence that "the memory may 
have been continually subject to change after it was initially stored" (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980, p. 419). This is evidence of an unconscious and active L TM. 
• How does background knowledge affect information processing? 
The L TM described by information processing is a passive storehouse at the end 
of the processing line. It is part ofthe "rigid architecture of the mind" (Mayer, 1996, p. 
157) that "typically glosses over questions concerning the nature and origin of the 
information process" (Beers, 1987, p. 374). However, considering LTM as the active 
constructor of concepts explains how background knowledge affects information 
processing. 
The L TM that constructs concepts and schemata is constantly guiding perception 
and WM. Specifically, we have thoroughly discussed how concepts and schemata affect 
perception, recognition, imagination, possible conception, and retrieval. We discussed 
how they can guide a student to perceive a sentence with only one "tall" when it had two, 
how they can guide Marco Polo to recognize a unicorn when he saw a rhinoceros, how 
they can guide someone to conceive of or imagine a "pink polar bear" or a "despotic 
democracy," but not a "dinkled diam," and how they can guide someone to falsely 
reconstruct the past. We can describe our background knowledge as our pre-existing 
concepts and schemata. Though we easily see how the pre-existing concepts and 
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schemata affect information processing in the case of errors, they always do affect it. And 
they always affect it unconsciously as the active L TM affects information processing. 
• How does information "pop" into one's consciousness? 
The passive LTM of infonnation processing cannot exert influence on WM, or 
consciousness. Yet experience tells us that unconscious concepts and schemata are 
continually flooding our consciousness with their rules, trying to apply them to 
experience to make meaning even as they are being fonned with experience. In other 
words, our background knowledge is shaping our new experiences, even as our new 
experiences are shaping our background knowledge. Infonnation is rapidly and 
uncontrollably flowing back and forth from consciousness to unconsciousness. Johnson 
& Sherman (1990) describe this in terms of time: 
Past, present and future fold backward and forward like Japanese origami. They 
collapse onto each other, emerge from each other, and constantly determine each 
other, as we construct and reconstruct both [sic] past, present and future in the 
present, and the past and future construct the present. (p. 482) 
This is not explained by the "rigid architecture of the mind" (Mayer 1996, p. 157) 
described by information processing theory in which information flows from sensory 
memory to working memory to passive long-term memory. However an active LTM, that 
is constantly shaping perception and WM, even while it is being shaped by perception 
and WM, is consistent with experience. An active L TM explains this fluid movement of 
information among our senses, our conscious present and our unconscious experiences 
and expectations. Where classic information fails to explain the role of beliefs and 
expectations in learning (Mayer, 1996), a Kantian analysis of cognition can succeed. 
• How does information enter L TM without ever being in WM? 
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Information processing suggests all information passes through WM before being 
encoded in L TM. Pashler and Carrier (1996) suggest this is the typical path, yet they 
affirm, "being in STM [short-term memory] may be neither necessary nor sufficient for 
copying into L TM" (p. 18). There is evidence that information enters directly into L TM. 
Kelly & Lindsay (1996) relay an anecdote about the French neurophysiologist Clarapede: 
who concealed a pin in his hand and pricked the hand of an amnesic woman while 
shaking hands with her. She quickly forgot the incident, but on a subsequent 
occasion when he moved his hand toward hers, she withdrew hers reflexively. 
"When I asked her for the reason, she said in a hurry, 'Doesn't one have the right 
to withdraw the hand?' and when I insisted, she said, 'Is there perhaps a pin 
hidden in your hand?''' (Clarapede, 1911/1951, p. 69). (p. 31-32.) 
The experience of the prick directly entered her unconscious L TM and later 
entered her conscious WM in an altered form. Not only can information directly enter 
L TM, it can be actively processed in L TM alone. The language acquisition device, 
suggested by Noam Chomsky (1972, 1976) is evidence of the active unconscious. The 
language acquisition device describes how children unconsciously form and follow 
syntactical rules. A child will say, "This one is gooder [sic]," even though he has never 
heard that mistake. The child has unconsciously formed and followed a syntactical rule. 
The language acquisition device is consistent with Kant's description of the 
understanding - the unconscious faculty that takes in experience and forms and follows 
rules. These rules are concepts and schemata. A child unconsciously forms and follows a 
syntactical rule, "If! add '--er' to a word, then it means 'more'." An anterograde amnesic 
unconsciously forms and follows a rule, "If this man extends his hand, then there might 
be a pin in it." Classic information processing cannot explain these things, but a Kantian 
analysis of cognition can. 
• How do constructivism and schema theory relate to our cognitive architecture? 
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In a simplified fonn, infonnation processing theory has typically depicted the 
relationships among memory stores as depicted in Figure 1. 
Sensory 
Memory 
Working 
Memory 
Encoding/Retrieval 
Figure I. Classic information processing with one-way flow of information. 
Long-Term 
Memory 
The problems of classic infonnation processing theory stem from its view of L TM as a 
passive storehouse of knowledge and the WM as the only active constructor of 
knowledge. A more accurate model arises from superimposing the Kantian two-tiered 
system of belief on the classic view of infonnation processing. This model is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
Sensory 
Memory 
Meta-attention / '-AsSimilation 
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Faculty of 
Reason BeliefslExpectations .. 
Figure 2. A unified view of information processing with fluid flow of information. 
• How do schemata relate to our cognitive architecture? 
Neither infonnation processing theory nor schema theory has answered important 
questions. Let's answer them from a unified theory developed from a Kantian analysis: 
• Where are schemata fonned? 
They are fonned in the unconscious and active L TM. 
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• Where are they stored? 
They are stored in the unconscious and active L TM. 
• Where do they operate? 
Concepts and schemata are beliefs and expectations that exert influence on WM 
and perception. 
This new model represents a unified theory of cognition. It relates the 
construction of schemata to cognitive architecture as described by information processing 
theory. The LTM is identified as the place where concepts and schemas are constructed. 
Importantly they are formed unconsciously directly from experience. The revising of 
these concepts and schemata in light of new knowledge is accommodation. 
This model also shows how concepts and schemata influence perception and WM. 
When concepts and schemata influence perception it can be described as assimilation. 
Assimilation occurs when existing concepts and schemata determine perceptions. 
Concepts and schemata affect WM as beliefs and expectations. These beliefs and 
expectations introduce information, assumptions, motivations, and biases into the 
reasoning process. All of these statements about how concepts and schemata affect 
various cognitive processes have been fully explained and exemplified in the preceding 
chapters. 
Essentially schema theory provides a "top-down" point of view to information 
processing because it stresses how background knowledge guides attention and 
perception. It has suffered from vagueness about exactly what schemata are and how they 
are formed. Classic information processing theory provides a "bottom-up" point of view 
to information processing because it stresses how knowledge is built up from sensory 
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perceptions. It suffers from an overly mechanistic and "rigid architecture of the mind" 
(Mayer 1996, p. 157), which can't explain the role of beliefs and expectations in learning 
(Mayer, 1996). 
Although it is commonly held that, "Processing is both bottom-up and top-down" 
(Andre, 1987, p. 270), educational psychology does not have one theory that supports this 
view. A unified cognitive theory would encompass both top-down and bottom-up 
processing. This model represents this kind of theory. Concepts and schemata are 
unconsciously formed in a bottom-up fashion directly from experience. This clarifies the 
vagueness of schema theory and constructivism. It is also true that concepts and schemata 
guide perception and reasoning in a top-down fashion. This provides a more fluid 
architecture that can explain the role of beliefs and expectations in learning. A Kantian 
analysis of concepts and schema superimposed on information processing theory has 
provided a more unified cognitive theory. It is time to offer a critique of Dual Coding 
Theory (DCT), as DCT presents itself as a challenge to Kantian schematism. 
A Rebuttal of Dual Coding Theory (DCT) 
As its name indicates, Dual Coding Theory (DCT) suggests that our knowledge 
exists in one of two codes, verbal and non-verbal. The verbal code includes the written 
and spoken word, while the non-verbal code includes images, tastes, smells, sounds, and 
haptic input. However, DCT's prime interest in the non-verbal code is the image; hence 
the name of a recent book on DCT, Imagery and Text (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001). 
Before describing the details ofDCT, it is very important to note that the unified 
theory presented in this paper also suggests that knowledge exists in two similar codes. A 
Kantian schema constructs images, while a concept constructs non-imaged meaning. On 
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this very basic and important proposition, DCT and the unified theory presented in this 
paper agree. Furthermore, the primary implication of DCT is the use of the "concrete 
example;" knowledge presented in both the verbal and non-verbal form will be more 
easily and meaningfully encoded. This is also the primary implication of this unified 
theory; people construct knowledge from examples so concepts should be first concretely 
exemplified and then abstractly described. 
If DCT and a unified theory both agree that knowledge is in two codes, imaged and 
non-imaged, and that teachers should use concrete examples that can be encoded in both 
codes as much as possible, is there a need to distinguish or choose between the two 
theories? Yes, because DCT theorists claim an "empiricist and pragmatic" approach as 
the basis ofDCT, specifically disdaining rationalism and "Kantean idealism" (Sadoski & 
Paivio, 2001, p. 6-7). This explicitly empiricist viewpoint ultimately leads to the same 
roadblocks hit by British empiricists and behaviorists: the mind is passive, not active or 
interactive, and learning is an involuntary association, not an act of will or construction. 
It is important that educational psychology avoids reverting to empiricist views in a 
"cognitive counter-revolution." It is my belief that DCT theorists have embraced 
empiricist ideas because of a misunderstanding of Kant's philosophy in general and his 
schema in particular, which I hope to clarify. Ultimately, we agree on the existence of 
distinct verbal and non-verbal meaning and the importance ofthe use of experience and 
example to learning. I hope to establish similar agreement on Kant's view of an 
interactive mind that constructs knowledge. 
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neT's and Kant's Philosophy 
DCT theorists view themselves "empiricist and pragmatic" (Sadoski & Paivio, 
2001, p. 6) and specifically disdain rationalism and "Kantean idealism" (p. 7). DCT 
theorists find their philosophical origins in Aristotle, whose "psychology was based in 
empiricism" (p. 15). They place Aristotle decidedly in the empiricist camp, though other 
educational psychologists correctly place him at the philosophical midpoint between 
experience-centered and mind-centered approaches (Reynolds et aI., 1996). DCT theorists 
claim Aristotle "held that all knowledge comes from sense experience" (Sadoski & 
Paivio, 2001, p. 15), but this is not empiricism. An empiricist like John Locke would say, 
"all knowledge comes from sense experience alone." Aristotle would not say that; he 
knew that our minds actively bring something to experience "to allow higher-order 
knowledge to emerge" although "he did not say exactly how the mind accomplishes this 
task" (Reynolds et aI., 1996, p. 94). 
What we do know is that Aristotle suggested "there must be an active 
intellect ... this [the working of the active intellect] is like light shining on colors and 
making them visible" (Clark, 195712000, p. 115). Our intellect actualizes sense 
experience, so our thought is always a composite of the two. What Aristotle grasped at 
while he tried to synthesize empiricism and rationalism, Kant clarifies and extends. As 
corroborated by Van Til: "The relation of Aristotle to his predecessors is therefore very 
similar to that of Kant to the empiricist, Burne, and the rationalist, Leibniz" (Bahnsen, 
1999, p. 331). 
This philosophical confusion shows up later when Sadoski and Paivio (2001) 
discuss Pestalozzi's object lesson, "the use of real objects for observation, verbal 
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description and verbal definition" (p. 30). Importantly, the object lesson is consistent with 
the implication of both DCT and a unified cognitive theory in that it stresses the 
importance of beginning instruction with concrete experiences and examples. Sadoski 
and Paivio (2001) conclude, "For Pestalozzi, as for Aristotle, concrete sense impression 
was the foundation of all knowledge" (p. 30). Yet they also state that Pestalozzi was 
influenced by Kant and Rousseau, stating Rousseau emphasized "extensive sensory 
experience" (p.29). The line of thought extends from Aristotle to Rousseau to Kant to 
Pestalozzi. They fail to see that Aristotle and Kant similarly balanced empirical and 
rational influences in a way that led to Pestalozzi's emphasis on concrete experience as 
the beginning of instruction. The point of all this is to say that DCT theorists wish to 
embrace Aristotle's views and reject Kant's; but their views are very similar. 
neT and Kant's Schema 
The proponents ofDCT suggest Kant's schemata are an example ofreification, 
the attribution of "actual existence to something that is only a name or abstraction" 
(Sadoski et aI., 1991, p. 467). In other words, schemata do not exist. They go on to ask, 
"schemata are, by most accounts, abstractions derived from experience that exist in a 
potential, nonspecific state, awaiting input. The epistemological question is how 
conceptual or schematic knowledge can exist in the abstract, isolated from any of the 
examples that gave rise to it" (p. 467). 
Is it true that a Kantian concept/schema is isolated from the examples that gave 
rise to it? No. For Kant, knowledge is a combination of us and the world around us. Just 
because we must have experience to gain knowledge does not mean that all our 
knowledge comes from experience; we humans bring something to experience to 
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construct knowledge. Just as we bring our eyes to experience to perceive an image, we 
bring our minds to experience to form knowledge. Just as the nature of our eyes (they can 
see some types of light, but not infrared or ultraviolet light) and our experience combine 
to determine what images we perceive, so the nature of our mind and experience combine 
to determine what knowledge we acquire. 
Knowledge comes from sense experience, but not from sense experience alone 
(despite the assertions of Locke, Hume, 20th century behaviorists, and DCT theorists). A 
Kantian schema is no more a reification than the idea of memory. Based on all the 
examples described earlier in this chapter, we can infer that people construct rules from 
experience. These rules are concepts and schemata and they do indeed exist. 
Ironically, while trying to distance themselves from schema theory, DCT theorists 
describe two hypothetical constructs, which are essentially the same as a Kantian concept 
and schema. DCT theorists suggest the existence of the logogen and imagen. Sadoski 
and Paivio (2001) describe logo gens and imagens as DCT's "building blocks" of 
cognition, the "basic representational units". Logogens can also be described as "verbal 
representations, verbal encodings, mental language and inner speech; imagens are 
alternatively called nonverbal representations, nonverbal encodings, mental images and 
imagery" (p. 46). Importantly, "the morpheme '-gen' means that which generates. Hence, 
logo gens are language generators and imagens are image generators; both are also useful 
in recognition" (p. 47). At this point one can see that the logogen corresponds directly to 
a Kantian concept while an imagen corresponds directly to a Kantian schema. They are 
hypothetical constructs that describe how we recognize and generate non-imaged and 
imaged meaning. What is the difference? 
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Dual coding theorists describe schemata as "abstract and amodal structures" (Sadoski 
& Paivio, 2001, p. 43) while logogens and imagens are modal and concrete. By "amodal" 
they mean schemata are separate from the modes of the five senses. While this criticism 
may be true of schemata as vaguely defined by current schema theorists, Kant's 
description of schemata avoids this criticism. Kant's concept/schemata does make a 
distinction between language and image, with the schema as the rule that guides the 
construction of images perceived, imagined or remembered. So Kant's schema is not 
amodal, it is linked to the visual mode. Kant's concept is linked to non-visual meaning. 
DCT also tries to distance itself from the "abstract" schemata by supposing that 
logogens and imagens "retain some of the original concrete qualities of the external 
experiences from which they derive ... This implies that our mental encodings themselves 
are concrete rather then abstract" (p. 44). If a "concrete" representation has "a basis in 
sense experience" then Kantian concepts and schema are just as concrete as a logogen 
and imagen. If a "concrete" representation "retains some elements of sense perception," 
then Kantian concepts and schemata are just as concrete as a logogen and imagen. But if 
a "concrete" representation is a "recording of sense experience," then neither logogens, 
imagens, concepts nor schemata are concrete, because perception and knowledge is 
constructed, not recorded. 
But DCT theorists also suggest that logo gens and imagens are concrete because they 
are "assumed to have physical form" (p. 46) and describe them as "neuronal structures" 
(p. 71). Is there empirical basis for this assumption? If so, it is just as strong an empirical 
basis for the "concreteness" of a Kantian concept and schema, which they describe as a 
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"reification," the attribution of "actual existence to something that is only a name or 
abstraction" (Sadoski et aI., 1991, p. 467). 
neT and Associative Learning 
DCT theorists admit "current views of meaning and comprehension in literacy 
have evolved away from extracting meaning from stimuli and toward the view of an 
active comprehender" (p. 68). Yet DCT leaves few activities to the learner. Ultimately, 
DCT claims that knowledge structures are built through associative learning as "repeated 
and invariant associative experience results in integrated higher order structures" (p. 61). 
Associative learning is the foundation of British empiricism and behaviorism, not the 
more balanced view of Aristotle (Reynolds et aI., 1996) or of Kant. DCT theorists 
embrace extreme empiricism when stating "all meaning may ultimately lie on a 
foundation of direct nonverbal experience" (p. 85). 
Describing learning as associative leads to the idea of a passive mind as described 
by empiricist philosopher 1.S. Mill "the direct forefather of modem behaviorism" 
(Reynolds et aI., 1996, p. 95) who believed that "the mind has no creative function 
because association is a passive process" (Schultz & Schultz, 1987, p. 37). The idea of 
learning as response strengthening which DCT calls the "repeated and invariant 
associative experience" held American psychology in a "strangle-hold" for decades, until 
successfully challenged by the cognitive revolution in the mid-twentieth century (Mayer, 
1996). We do not need to return to the idea of associative learning, as DCT would 
encourage us. Instead we need to clarify an approach balanced between empiricist 
(experience-centered) and rationalist (mind-centered) extremes. The next chapter will 
explicitly state the implications of a unified cognitive theory for K-12 classrooms. 
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Chapter V: Discussion 
Teachers in K-12 classrooms "do not routinely locate and translate research-based 
knowledge to inform their efforts" (Hiebert, Gallimore, & Stigler, 2002, p. 3). The 
understanding required to interpret the information in a range of theories often 
overwhelms teachers and detracts from their abilities to use these theories to inform their 
practice. Any unified theory of learning, must therefore explicitly state and demonstrate 
its implications for effective classroom use. 
The present literature of cognition does not give clear implications for classrooms. 
Information processing theory, schema theory and constructivism exhibit limitations and 
lack cohesion. Each theory is limited by vagueness and an inability to describe common 
phenomena. They also lack cohesion in their explanation of learning. These limitations 
and lack of cohesion make their application in teaching-learning environments difficult. 
Not only has a Kantian analysis clarified the vagueness, extended the limitations 
and generally unified current cognitive theories, but it has important implications for 
teachers'thinking. Since, according to Kant, the unconscious formation of concepts 
depends on the combination of innate cognitive structures and sense experiences, 
carefully crafting experiences for students is essential. These crafted experiences aid 
natural learning by providing approximations of the authentic experiences people 
encounter in day-to-day living, while simultaneously helping students reach important 
learning goals. 
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Teachers' thinking should then focus on their goals and ways to most effectively 
exemplify topics that will aid this unconscious concept formation and help students reach 
the goals. This suggestion is corroborated by additional research (Cassady, 1999; Spiro, 
Feldovich, Jacobson & Coulson, 1992); it is consistent with thinking about the creation of 
productive learning environments (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000); it is grounded 
in current views ofthe processes involved in learning to teach (Borko & Putnam, 1996); 
it begins to answer the question about the teacher's role in learners' construction of 
understanding, as well as the question about learner background differences. 
High quality examples accommodate differences in learner background 
knowledge, lead to the formation of concepts, and provide frameworks for problem 
solving and other higher-order cognitive processes. The contributions of existing theories 
then guide teachers' actions, such as guiding learners through social interaction (Wink & 
Putney, 2002) and accommodating the limitations oflearners working memories 
(Sweller, et aI., 1998). In summary, viewing concepts/schemata as rules unconsciously 
formed implies: 
1. Teachers should describe the concept to be taught as a rule. 
2. Teachers should introduce the concept rule by experience or by example. 
3. Teachers should use the concept rule as a framework for effective 
questioning. 
4. Teachers should describe the rule with abstract language only after 
students have understood the rule. 
As noted above, after a thorough study of information processing, constructivism and 
schema theory, a classroom teacher would still be left with important unanswered 
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questions. Let's restate these questions and answer them based on the implications of a 
unified theory: 
• If students construct their own understanding, what is my role? 
The role of the teacher is to identify concepts to be taught, to assemble a 
wide variety of examples of the concept, and help students construct rules about the 
concept so that they can recognize and create examples of the concept. 
• How can I help students construct schemata if I am not sure what they are? 
Schemata are rules or guidelines students use to recognize or create 
examples of concepts. For example, if a student has constructed a rule such as, If an 
animal is warm·blooded, has hair or fur, gives live birth, and drinks mother's milk, 
then it is a mammal, then that student can recognize, supply or create examples of 
mammals. When teachers help students construct such rules, they are helping them 
construct schemata. 
• How do I accommodate learner background differences and the influences these 
differences have on the processes involved in knowledge construction? 
Ask questions to determine background knowledge and build it as 
necessary. A teacher won't be able to effectively teach about mammals unless his 
students have already formed concepts of warm-blooded, hair, fur, live birth, and 
mother's milk. The way to find out if students have the requisite background 
knowledge is to ask questions, "What do you notice about this animal? Why do think 
this polar bear has so much hair and is so fat? How do the babies get food?" If the 
students do not already possess an understanding of and language to describe 
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background concepts, the teacher must go back and lay this foundation before 
continuing. 
• How can I help students adapt to the limitations of working memory? 
Use examples of the concept; do not use abstract descriptions of the 
concept. Abstract descriptions place a large load on working memory. A high school 
English teacher should not begin a lesson on effective introductions by saying, "If an 
introduction persuades the reader to be attentive, interested and well-disposed to the 
text, then it is an efIective introduction. An introduction can get the attention of the 
reader by being unique ... etc." The teacher should have the students read effective 
introductions and then help them perceive their characteristics. Once they have 
understood from the examples, then the teacher may abstractly name and describe the 
concepts. 
Let's take a more detailed look at how each of these four implications should affect 
classroom practice. 
1. Teachers should describe the concept to be taught as a rule. 
Effective teachers set goals for instruction. Some goals teachers may set are: 
• If a closed two-dimensional figure has three-sides of any length and three-
angles of any degree, then it is a triangle 
• If an introduction persuades the reader to be attentive, interested and well-
disposed to the text, then it is an effective introduction 
• If an animal is warm-blooded, has hair or fur, gives live birth, and drinks 
mother's milk, then it is a mammal. 
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Teachers can use "if. .. then" statements to clarify goals as represented above. The 
"if. .. then" statement is preferable to a typical concept definition because the 
characteristics precede the concept name. This helps to remind teachers that student must 
perceive and understand these characteristics before the concept can be known. These 
characteristics are the background knowledge students must possess before they can learn 
the concept. Once a student has constructed these rules so that he or she can recognize 
and create examples of the concept, a learning goal has been met. 
2. Teachers should introduce the concept rule by experience or by example. 
A middle school English is in the middle of a unit on critical thinking. Currently she 
is teaching her students about informal fallacies, common errors in reasoning. One of 
today's concepts is chronological snobbery. She considers her objective, "I want the 
students to recognize that if someone likes or dislikes something simply because of how 
old it is, they are committing the fallacy of chronological snobbery." She has assembled 
some examples of this concept. The teacher places a transparency on the overhead and 
says, "Johnny, read aloud the sentence on the overhead." Johnny reads, "I can't believe 
you still support trickle-down economic policy. That was formulated way back in the 
1980's. It is so out of touch with today's economic realities." The teacher asks, "Is there a 
problem with this reasoning? What is it ... Sarah?" Sarah responds, "The speaker does not 
define his term. We don't know what he means by trickle-down economics." "That's 
right," the teacher affirms, "but is there another problem? ... What do you think Rick?" 
Rick stops to search for the right words and begins, "Well, the speaker doesn't give a 
valid reason for not supporting trickle-down economic policy. He just doesn't like it 
because it is old." The teacher smiles, "That's right, just because something is old is no 
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reason to dislike something ... Hank, read the next example." Hank snaps up in his seat 
and reads, "Courtship is the proper way for young people to pursue romantic interest. 
Courtship was working centuries before dating was even developed." "What is the 
problem here?" asks the teacher. Gretchen raises her hand and says, "It's the same 
problem." "Exactly the same, Gretchen?" the teacher probes. Gretchen responds, "Well, 
this person thinks we should like something because it is old when the other said we 
should not like something because it is old." The teacher nods, "Exactly. Is this a 
fallacy?" Hank says, "Well a fallacy is an error in reasoning, and these are not good 
reasons." The teacher raises her hands palms up, "So what is the fallacy or error in 
reasoning in these examples ... Jenny?" Jenny says confidently, "That we should like or 
not like something just because of how old it is." The teacher claps her hands together, 
"You're right, Jenny, that is exactly right. If we suggest that someone should like or 
dislike something just because of how old it is, then we have committed a fallacy." 
The very first act of teaching is to represent the concept with high quality 
examples. This way, students can apply their background knowledge, their current 
concepts and schemata, to the example. Through questioning, the teacher can evaluate the 
level of background knowledge. This allows the LTM to construct the new 
concepts/ schemata. 
3. Teachers should use the concept rule as a framework for effective questioning. 
A Kindergarten teacher wants to teach her students about triangles. She knows she 
wants the students to recognize and create examples of triangles, but how does she get 
them to do this accurately and consistently? She thinks about how we know what a 
triangle is, "If a shape is flat and has three connected sides, then it's a triangle." She 
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knows she must help her students perceive and understand all these characteristics of 
triangles: shape, flat, three sides, connected. Using examples of triangles, she focuses her 
questions on each of these characteristics. Standing in front of her class, she points to 
several triangles drawn on the board. She smiles, "What do you notice about these 
shapes ... Hunter?" "There all the same," answers Hunter. "How are they the same?" she 
asks. "They're all pointy," says Hunter, "They all have three points." "Aha!" the teacher 
exclaims while she wonders to herself why she didn't think of that characteristic, "What 
else ... Latisha?" Latisha beams, "They all have three sides." "What else?" she queries, 
"How are they different ... Mackenzie?" "Wen, some are big and some are small," 
Mackenzie suggests. "That's right," affirms the teacher, "but they are still the same shape 
even if they are different sizes, aren't they?" The teacher points to a square, "What is 
different about this shape?" Mackenzie blurts out, "It has four sides!" "That's right," then 
she corrects the eager student, "but remember to raise your hand, OK?" The teacher then 
points to three lines that are not connected and asks, "What about this one ... Vonda?" 
"The side is not connected, right?" "Yes, that is different from these shapes, isn't it?" the 
teacher affirms as she points to the triangles. The teacher then holds up a piece of wood 
in the shape of a pyramid, "What about this one? How is it different from these on the 
board ... Kellie?" Kellie wonders, "It's not flat?" "No it's certainly not," agrees the 
teacher while she pretends to struggle to press the pyramid flat on the desk. The class 
giggles. The teacher points again to the triangles on the board, "Now, what do all the 
shapes on the board have in common?" Madeline says, "They are flat and have three 
sides." Logan clarifies, "And the sides are connected." The teacher summarizes, "Yes, if 
a shape is flat and has three connected sides, then we call it a triangle. Everyone say 
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'triangle'" The class responds in chorus as they watch the teacher write 'triangle' on the 
board. The teacher instructs, "Now draw a triangle on your paper." 
The characteristics of a concept that follow the "if' in the hypothetical inference 
should be the focus of teacher questioning. It is important that the students actively 
perceive and conceptualize these characteristics. This is how students form concepts and 
schemata. After students construct their understanding the teacher labels concepts and 
evaluates students' mastery. 
4. Teachers should describe the concept with abstract language only after students 
have understood the concept. 
Let's rejoin our lesson on fallacies right after the students have formed the rule, "If 
we suggest that someone like or dislike something just because of how old it is, then we 
have committed a fallacy." The teacher repeats, "That's right. If someone wants us to like 
or dislike something just because of how old it is, then they have committed the fallacy of 
chronological snobbery." She writes 'chronological snobbery' on the board and asks, 
"Why do you think this fallacy is called 'chronological snobbery' ... DanielleT "Well, a 
snob is '" Hank!" she jokes, "I mean a snob is someone who thinks they are better than 
someone else". The lesson continues ... 
After the essential characteristics of the concept have been perceived, then the 
teacher can label the concept. This teacher has avoided overloading working memory 
with abstract information. The teacher would have ineffectively overloaded the working 
memory if she had begun the lesson, "Chronological snobbery is the fallacy of liking 
something or disliking something just because of how old it is. Can someone give me an 
example ... anyone?" 
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Conclusion 
Though Kant is remembered for his world-changing philosophy, we should not forget 
that he was a university professor renowned for his lectures. He revealed his passion for 
education when he proclaimed, "the greatest and most difficult problem to which man 
can devote himself is the problem of education" (Kant, 180411966, p. 11). He did in fact 
write one treatise of education, Lecture Notes on Pedagogy, which showed the deep 
influence of Rousseau; it focuses almost exclusively on moral and physical education. 
The terms "concept" or "schema" never appear. Buchner (1904) notes, "The reader of the 
Lecture Notes on Pedagogy will doubtless be struck by the apparent absence of the 
former [Kant's psychological theory] upon the latter [Kant's educational theory]" (p. 52). 
But is the unified theory presented in this paper consistent with the little that Kant wrote 
concerning education? 
We do find such a consistency. In one of the few passages relevant to this topic Kant 
advises, "The understanding may at first be cultivated, in a certain way, passively also, 
either by quoting examples which prove the rules, or, on the contrary, by discovering 
rules for particular cases" (Kant, 180411966, p. 79). Here Kant describes the 
understanding as rules and suggests they can be cultivated or discovered passively 
(constructed unconsciously) from examples. This is clearly consistent with the unified 
theory presented in this paper. Kant also advises about sequence of instruction: 
Here the question arises whether the rules shall be first studied 'in abstracto,' and 
whether they ought to be studied after they have been applied, or whether the rule and 
application should be studied side by side. This last is the only advisable course; 
otherwise the application of the rule is very uncertain till the rule itself is learned. (p. 
76) 
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This is consistent with the four implications of the unified theory described above. In 
each lesson the rule is first learned from example, then named and described 'in 
abstracto,' and then applied by recognizing or creating other examples. Kant gives this 
advice without specifically basing it on his psychological theory. However it is clear that 
this advice is consistent with Kant's psychological theory and both Piaget's (1952, 1959, 
1970) and Vygotsky's (1978, 1986) views of development. 
An analysis of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant has clarified and unified the 
current cognitive theories of information processing, schema theory, and constructivism. 
This unified theory has provided clear implications to classroom teachers to improve 
practice. Principal among them is that teachers should introduce and design instruction 
around high-quality examples of concepts. 
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